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ARTICLE

Passive Avoidance
Anita S. Krishnakumar*
Abstract. In its nascent years, the Roberts Court quickly developed a reputation—and
drew sharp criticism—for using the canon of constitutional avoidance to rewrite statutes
in controversial, high-profile cases. In recent years, however, the Court seems to have
taken a new turn, quietly creating exceptions or reading in statutory conditions in order
to evade potentially serious constitutional problems without expressly discussing the
constitutional issue or invoking the avoidance canon. In fact, the avoidance canon seems
largely, and conspicuously, missing from many cases decided during the Court’s most
recent Terms, playing a significant role in justifying the Court’s construction in only one
majority opinion since 2012.
This Article examines the Roberts Court’s recent shift in approach to the avoidance canon.
It departs from the conventional wisdom about the Roberts Court and the avoidance
canon in several important ways. First, it posits that the conventional view about the
Roberts Court’s aggressive use of the avoidance canon may itself have contributed to the
Court’s shift away from invoking the canon in recent Terms—that is, the Court may have
ratcheted down its use of the canon in response to commentators’ attacks against its
reliance on avoidance in its early Terms. Second, this Article argues that the Roberts Court
has recently adopted a passive rather than aggressive form of avoidance, in which it
effectively avoids deciding controversial, unresolved constitutional questions—but
without invoking avoidance, and without openly admitting to rewriting or straining the
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statute’s text. Third, and perhaps most importantly, this Article uncovers several new
tools of “passive avoidance” that the Court has employed to do the work previously
performed by the avoidance canon. In the end, it posits that passive avoidance may
actually be a good thing—and the truest form of constitutional avoidance.
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Introduction
In its recent decision in Yates v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that a fish is not a “tangible object” under a criminal statute that imposes up to
twenty years in prison for any individual who “knowingly alters, destroys,
mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record,
document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence
[an] investigation.”1 In so ruling, the Court invoked numerous canons of
statutory construction, dictionary definitions, legislative history, the purpose
of the statute—including the mischief it was designed to reach—and even the
title caption of the section at issue.2 Conspicuously missing from this tour de
force of statutory construction was the avoidance canon—or any mention of
the serious constitutional vagueness concerns raised by the statute and
discussed at some length at oral argument.3
What makes this omission especially curious is that it seems to be part of a
recurring pattern and a surprising role reversal for the Roberts Court. There
used to be a familiar story about the Roberts Court and the avoidance canon:
When confronted with a serious constitutional challenge to a statute—
particularly if the statute was one with high political visibility—the Court
would not invalidate the statute, even if a majority of the Justices believed the
statute to be unconstitutional.4 Instead, the Court—often in an opinion
authored by the Chief Justice—would discuss the constitutional infirmity at
length and then would pivot and invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance

1. See 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1078-79 (2015) (plurality opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519); see also

id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
2. See id. at 1081-88 (plurality opinion).
3. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (No. 13-7451), 2014 WL
9866152 [hereinafter Yates Oral Argument] (Justice Kennedy: “[I]t seems to me that the
test [the defendant] suggest[s] has almost more problems with vagueness . . . .”); id. at 17
(Justice Breyer: “But where you end up at the end of the road is that this is void for
vagueness . . . .”).
4. See, e.g., ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43706, THE DOCTRINE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 11, 15-16 (2014) (observing that the
Roberts Court has “frequently” sidestepped major constitutional questions); Eric S. Fish,
Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1276-78
(2016) (describing how the Roberts Court dodged “thorny” constitutional questions in
several early-Term cases); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance:
The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2110 (2015) (“In the
last few years, the Supreme Court has resolved some of the most divisive and
consequential cases before it with the same maneuver: construing statutes to avoid
constitutional difficulty.”).
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to justify limiting the statute’s reach or otherwise construing the relevant
provision so as to avoid the constitutional difficulty—even if doing so required
straining the statute’s text.5
As the story suggests, in its early years, the Roberts Court developed a
reputation for aggressively using the avoidance canon to rewrite statutes in
several controversial, high-profile cases.6 Most notoriously, avoidance was the
hook that Chief Justice Roberts used to uphold the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)7 and to save (for a
time) the preclearance coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA) in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder.8 Notably,
in NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts invoked avoidance only after making clear that
the ACA did not fall within Congress’s powers under either the Commerce
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause.9 And in Northwest Austin, Chief
5. Indeed, one commentator has referred to the avoidance canon pivot as Chief Justice

Roberts’s “signature move.” See Fish, supra note 4, at 1278-79.
6. See, e.g., id. at 1276-79; Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2110-13; Damon Root, John

Roberts’ Constitutional Avoidance, REASON (June 4, 2014), https://perma.cc/DQ4D-83X3.
7. See 567 U.S. 519, 561-63 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also Patient Protection and

Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts was the sole Justice who made the avoidance pivot; four
dissenting Justices agreed that the straightforward reading of the statute was unconstitutional, see 567 U.S. at 649-57 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(concluding that the ACA’s individual mandate exceeds Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause), and the other four Justices found no constitutional infirmity but
agreed with the Chief Justice that the penalty provision could be construed as a “tax,”
see id. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (arguing that the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to enact
the individual mandate and that the mandate also was a proper exercise of Congress’s
taxing power); see also id. at 561-63 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (concluding, in a portion
of the opinion joined by no other Justices, that the individual mandate must be
construed as imposing a tax); id. at 563-74 (majority opinion) (upholding the individual
mandate as a tax).
8. See 557 U.S. 193, 196-97 (2009); see also Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott
King, César E. Chávez, Barbara C. Jordan, William C. Velásquez, and Dr. Hector P.
Garcia Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-246, § 4, 120 Stat. 577, 580 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(8) (2017)),
invalidated in part by Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§ 10303).
9. In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts began his analysis with a lengthy explanation of why the
ACA’s individual mandate exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, see 567 U.S. at 547-61 (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.)—and then pivoted to uphold the provision as a tax instead, see id. at
563-66 (majority opinion). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the
power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving
Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
footnote continued on next page
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Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court invoked avoidance only after clarifying
that the VRA’s preclearance provision likely violated constitutional norms
about treating states equally.10
Indeed, two things stand out about the Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance
canon during the period between 2006 and 2012. First, it invoked the canon
regularly—in ten majority or plurality opinions and eight concurring or
dissenting opinions over seven Terms, for an average of 2.6 times per Term.11
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”). The Chief Justice’s opinion acknowledged that “the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a
tax,” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 574 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.), but concluded that it was
appropriate to read the provision as a tax in order to “save the Act,” see id. at 562
(quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.)).
10. In Northwest Austin, the Court construed the VRA’s “bailout” provision to permit
covered jurisdictions, like the utility district bringing the lawsuit, to terminate their
covered status. See 557 U.S. at 206-11; see also 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1)(A). As discussed in
Part I.A below, this was an implausible reading of the statute and was not the primary
focus of the Court’s opinion, which began with a lengthy discussion of the constitutional issue and turned to the statutory question only after concluding that “[t]he Act’s
preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional
questions.” See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 201-06.
11. For the majority and plurality opinions that invoked the avoidance canon, see Perry v.
Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 395 (2012) (per curiam); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 526 (2011);
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405-06 (2010); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 205-06;
Hawaii v. Office of Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 176 (2009); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S.
1, 21 (2009) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S.
511, 514 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153-54 (2007); and Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion). See also NFIB, 567 U.S. at 563 (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.) (invoking avoidance in a portion of the opinion not joined by any
other Justice).
For the concurring and dissenting opinions, see Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432,
450 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 60
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich,
L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 623 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 405-08, 408 n.16 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 565-67 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 805-06 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Gonzalez v.
United States, 553 U.S. 242, 269 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); and Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 113 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
These cases, listed in the Appendix below, were identified as part of a larger empirical
study for which I and at least one research assistant reviewed every case decided during
the Roberts Court’s 2005 through 2016 Terms (beginning from January 31, 2006, when
Justice Alito joined the Court) that confronted a question of statutory interpretation.
Every case decided during that period was examined to determine whether it dealt
with a statutory issue. Any case in which the Court’s opinion contained a substantial
discussion about statutory meaning was included in the study, although cases
interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not included.
This selection methodology yielded 499 statutory cases, each of which was coded for its
reliance on several different interpretive tools, including substantive canons such as
the avoidance canon. The study coded as avoidance cases only those opinions in which
footnote continued on next page
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More importantly, in the vast majority of those opinions, the Court (or the
concurring or dissenting opinion) engaged in “significant” discussion of the
constitutional difficulty at issue, or placed “primary” or “some” reliance on the
canon.12 Second, the Court (or concurring or dissenting opinion) often used the
canon aggressively to adopt a construction that deviated from the statute’s
most natural reading, in order to elide a constitutional problem that otherwise
would have required it to invalidate the statute—and it frequently was open
and frank about what it was doing.13
Following these decisions, scholars and commentators roundly criticized the
Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance canon, accusing the Court of distorting the
canon and engaging in disguised judicial activism. For example, one commentathe Court (or a or concurring or dissenting Justice) relied on the avoidance canon;
opinions in which the avoidance canon was mentioned but rejected as inapplicable
were not counted.
In a similar study of the Roberts Court’s statutory cases, Nina Mendelson recorded two
additional cases as relying on the avoidance canon during the same time period (for a
total of twenty such cases). See Nina A. Mendelson, Compendium of Roberts Court
Constitutional Avoidance Cases (2018) (on file with author); see also Nina A. Mendelson,
Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in
the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2018). One of these cases reflects a
difference of opinion regarding whether a dissenting opinion explicitly invoked the
canon, see Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 33-35 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the statute at issue is unconstitutionally vague but not explicitly invoking the
avoidance canon or concept), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015), while the other case is one that I screened out as constitutional rather than
statutory and therefore did not include in my dataset, see United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460 (2010). Mendelson also coded several additional cases that mentioned but did
not apply the avoidance canon; these were not coded in my study. See Mendelson,
Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation, supra, at 94-95.
12. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 561-63 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (significant discussion, primary
reliance); Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (some discussion); Plata, 563 U.S.
at 526 (primary reliance); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 405-09 (primary reliance); Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. at 55-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (significant discussion); Jerman, 559
U.S. at 623 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (some reliance); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 405-08
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (significant discussion, primary
reliance); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204-06 (significant discussion, primary reliance); Office
of Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. at 176 (primary reliance); Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 21-25 (opinion of
Kennedy, J.) (significant discussion, some reliance); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 803-08
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (significant discussion, primary reliance); Office of Senator
Mark Dayton, 550 U.S. at 513-15 (some reliance); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 150-54 (some
reliance). For a comparison to other cases decided by the Roberts Court, see Appendix
below.
13. See, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 562 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“The most straightforward
reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.”);
Skilling, 561 at 405-09; Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 206-07 (acknowledging that “[t]here is no
dispute that the district is a political subdivision of the State of Texas in the ordinary
sense of the term”). For a detailed discussion of the Court’s use of the avoidance canon
in these cases, see Part I.A below.
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tor charged the Court with using the avoidance canon as a “tool . . . to move
constitutional law and policy in the Court’s [preferred] direction.”14 Another
reproached the Court for using the canon to pave the way for “disruptive”
constitutional change and as a “playbook for judicial action.”15 Still others
accused the Court of employing the avoidance canon to “camouflage[] acts of
judicial aggression in both the constitutional and statutory spheres.”16
In several recent cases, however, the Court seems to have taken a new
turn—quietly creating exceptions or reading conditions into statutes in order
to elide potentially serious constitutional problems without expressly
discussing the constitutional issue or invoking the avoidance canon.17 The
Court has done so despite the fact that in each case, the constitutional issue was
addressed at length in the briefs and discussed by the Justices at oral
argument.18 In those few later-Term cases in which the Court has invoked the
14. Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009

SUP. CT. REV. 181, 184; see also id. at 220.
15. See Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 173, 173-74 (2014).
16. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2111-12.
17. For the cases highlighted by this Article, see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015);

Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074
(2015); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); and Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). These cases are discussed in depth in Part II.A below.
18. For discussion of the constitutional issue in King, see Transcript of Oral Argument at
49-50, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 2399405 [hereinafter King Oral
Argument]; Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Affirmance at 42-44, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 412333 [hereinafter
King States’ Brief]; and Brief of Amici Curiae Jewish Alliance for Law & Social Action
(JALSA) et al. in Support of Respondents at 36-37, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114),
2015 WL 350366 [hereinafter King JALSA Brief].
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Elonis, see Transcript of Oral Argument at
46-47, 53-55, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 9866158 [hereinafter Elonis
Oral Argument]; and Brief for the Petitioner at 34-61, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13983), 2014 WL 4101234 [hereinafter Elonis Petitioner’s Brief].
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Yates, see Yates Oral Argument, supra
note 3, at 5, 36-37; Brief for Eighteen Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 33-35, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (No. 13-7451), 2014 WL 3101373;
and Brief of Petitioner at 25-28, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (No. 13-7451), 2014 WL 2965254
[hereinafter Yates Petitioner’s Brief].
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Bond, see Transcript of Oral Argument at
30-33, 43-45, 48-49, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158), 2013 WL 6908184 [hereinafter
Bond Oral Argument]; and Brief for Petitioner at 42-46, 54-62, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077
(No. 12-158), 2013 WL 1963862 [hereinafter Bond Petitioner’s Brief].
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Adoptive Couple, see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 26, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 6908189
[hereinafter Adoptive Couple Oral Argument]; and Brief for Petitioners at 43-56, Adoptive
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597 [hereinafter Adoptive Couple
Petitioners’ Brief].
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avoidance canon, its tone and approach to the canon have changed
dramatically. Only one of the decisions in the last four Terms that invoked
avoidance gave the statute at issue a dubious or clearly strained reading—and
that case relied primarily on a different canon of construction, mentioning
avoidance only briefly.19 Moreover, only five (of 311) statutory opinions issued
by the Court since 2012 have provided a significant discussion of a constitutional issue raised by a rejected interpretation (and four of those were solo
dissents or concurrences authored by Justice Thomas).20 This is despite the fact
that serious constitutional concerns were implicated in many of the statutory
cases decided by the Court during this period.
This Article is the first to examine the Roberts Court’s diminished reliance
on the avoidance canon in recent years. It suggests that the Court has replaced
express, open reliance on the avoidance canon with what I call “passive
avoidance”—that is, a form of stealth constitutional avoidance that recalls
Alexander Bickel’s “passive virtues” of judicial decisionmaking. As discussed in
detail below, Bickel famously coined the term “passive virtues” to describe
judicial decisionmaking that declines to resolve cases on substantive grounds if
narrower grounds are available for deciding the case.21
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews the Roberts Court’s
prominent early use of the avoidance canon to openly air constitutional
infirmities and adopt strained statutory constructions, as well as the critical
commentary generated by this approach. Part II examines the Court’s practice
in recent Terms of interpreting statutes to avoid a constitutional difficulty that
was—often extensively—briefed and discussed at oral argument, without
discussing the avoidance canon in its opinion.
Finally, Part III offers a possible explanation for the Roberts Court’s failure
to invoke the avoidance canon expressly in several of its later-Term cases, even
as it strained a statute’s text to effectively avoid serious constitutional
difficulties. It submits that the Court may be reacting to the spate of negative
commentary that followed its prominent use of the avoidance canon in earlier
Terms—that is, the Court may have entered something of an “avoidance
retreat” period during which it has racheted down its use of the canon
19. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088-94 (relying primarily on the federalism clear statement

principle).
20. For the five cases, see NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946-49 (2017) (Thomas, J.,

concurring); McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372-73 (2016); Taylor v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2082-89 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Adoptive Couple,
133 S. Ct. at 2565-71 (Thomas, J., concurring); and Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2261-70 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also infra
Appendix.
21. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); infra Part III.B.
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following a period of high use that created controversy and criticism.22 As part
of this retreat, the Court may be engaging in a Bickelian exercise of “passive
virtues”—using narrower tools than the powerful avoidance canon in order to
escape making momentous pronouncements about constitutional issues unless
absolutely necessary, and thereby avoid the backlash that its earlier, open use of
avoidance engendered.23
Part III also highlights several tools of passive avoidance that the Court has
employed in recent years to avoid constitutional difficulties without explicitly
invoking the avoidance canon. In lieu of procedural techniques like standing
and ripeness,24 these tools of passive avoidance include traditional statutory
interpretation canons that are close cousins of avoidance—such as the rule of
lenity and the federalism clear statement principle—as well as other tools, like
the “mischief” rule, that help the Court defeat charges of judicial activism.
Ultimately, this Article suggests that passive avoidance may be a positive
development—and perhaps the truest form of constitutional avoidance.
I.

The Early Roberts Court: Active Avoidance

This Part first highlights how the early Roberts Court earned a reputation
for using the avoidance canon aggressively to adopt strained statutory
constructions. It then chronicles the critical scholarly and journalistic response
that followed the Court’s early-Term use of the avoidance canon.
A. Early-Term Cases
The Appendix below lists every case decided between 2006 and 2016 in
which the Roberts Court, or a member of the Roberts Court writing
separately, has invoked the avoidance canon. The Appendix also notes the level
of constitutional discussion engaged in by the Court or the concurring or
dissenting opinion (characterizing it as either “significant,” “some,” or “little”)
and the level of reliance that the opinion placed on the avoidance canon in
reaching its statutory construction (characterizing it as either “primary,”
“some,” or “passing”).
22. Such an “avoidance retreat” would not be unprecedented, as the Court similarly

ratcheted down its use of the avoidance canon following a period of high use during the
McCarthy Era. See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren
Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 401 (2005); infra notes 261-72 and accompanying text.
23. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962).
24. See Bickel, supra note 21, at 42-47 (arguing that the Court employs other legal doctrines
in service of narrow decisionmaking, including standing, ripeness, and the political
question doctrine).
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The avoidance cases from the Roberts Court’s early Terms took two basic
forms. The first is “modern avoidance,” in which the Court explains that one
interpretation of a statute poses a constitutional difficulty and then declares
that the difficulty can be avoided because the statute sensibly—and perhaps
even most plausibly—can be read to have an alternate meaning.25 The Court
does not insist that the rejected interpretation definitively would be
unconstitutional; it simply points out that the interpretation raises “serious” or
“grave” constitutional “doubts” and cites this as a reason to choose an alternate
construction.26 Modern avoidance has been so labeled in contrast to its
precursor “classic avoidance,” which required the Court to find that an
interpretation would be unconstitutional before rejecting it.27 A number of the
Roberts Court’s early-Term cases employed modern avoidance, and those cases,
on the whole, have received little attention from scholars or commentators.28
The second form of avoidance reflected in the Roberts Court’s early-Term
cases, by contrast, is similar to classic avoidance and has garnered a great deal of
critical attention.29 In these cases, the Court has typically begun by engaging in
an extended discussion of the constitutional difficulty created by a particular
statutory construction. The Court then declares that, for the reasons it has
elaborated, X reading of the statute would be (or almost certainly would be)
25. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 4, at 1282-83 (“[S]o-called modern avoidance . . . only requires

that the court have ‘constitutional doubts’ about the disfavored reading.”).
26. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Office of Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 176 (2009) (noting that the statute

“would raise grave constitutional concerns” if construed to “‘cloud’ Hawaii’s title to its
sovereign lands”); see also United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. of the U.S. v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”); John
Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1497
(1997) (“[C]ourts since Delaware & Hudson have employed the more prudential doubts
canon.”).
27. See Fish, supra note 4, at 1282; Nagle, supra note 26, at 1497-98; Adrian Vermeule, Saving
Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (“The basic difference between classical and
modern avoidance is that the former requires the court to determine that one plausible
interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires only a
determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional.”).
28. See, e.g., Office of Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. at 176; Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009)
(opinion of Kennedy, J.). For similar invocations of modern avoidance in dissenting
opinions, see, for example, Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 450 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573,
623 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.
502, 565-67 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
While these cases are not the focus of this Subpart, it is important to note that the
Court in recent Terms has failed to invoke even this limited form of avoidance in
several cases in which significant constitutional difficulties were posed and discussed in
briefing and at oral argument. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part I.B.
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unconstitutional. Finally, it announces that in order to save the statute from
constitutional infirmity, X construction must be rejected and Y construction,
which reads in (or out) any parameters necessary to solve the constitutional
problem, should be adopted. And voilà! The statute is rewritten but saved.
What is unique about these cases and this form of avoidance is that the
Court has been fairly open about the fact that it is rewriting, or at least
tweaking, the statute at issue—rather than presenting the choice before it as
one between two competing, plausible interpretations, as modern avoidance
dictates and as prior Courts have done.30 Moreover, the Roberts Court has used
this form of avoidance to rewrite statutes based on constitutional arguments
and analyses that are novel.31 Significantly, the principal opinion in two out of
three of these “rewriting” cases was authored by Chief Justice Roberts—making
this very much his (and not just his Court’s) legacy.32
Consider the following three cases, in which the Court essentially found a
constitutional infirmity and openly rewrote the relevant statute to avoid it.
1.

Northwest Austin Municipal District No. One v. Holder

In Northwest Austin Municipal District No. One v. Holder, the Court construed
section 5 of the VRA, which requires jurisdictions that have a history of
discriminating against minority voters to obtain preclearance from the federal
government before they may implement any change in voting practices or
procedures.33 The preclearance requirement in section 5 initially was set to
expire after five years,34 but Congress repeatedly renewed it—in 1970, 1975,
1982, and again in 2006.35 Almost immediately after the 2006 renewal, a utility
30. Modern avoidance directs courts to use the avoidance canon as “a tool for choosing

31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the
reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises
serious constitutional doubts.” See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381-82 (2005); see also
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[I]f
a serious doubt of unconstitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.” (emphasis added) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932))).
See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2133-35, 2139-49.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 561-63 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.); id. at 563-69 (majority opinion); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204-06 (2009). The majority opinion in the third case was authored
by Justice Ginsburg. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 198-99; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
§ 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2017)).
See Voting Rights Act § 4(a), 79 Stat. at 438 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303).
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 314, 315
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303); Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101,
89 Stat. 400, 400 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303); Voting Rights Act Amendfootnote continued on next page
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district in Austin, Texas, filed suit, claiming that it should be entitled to bailout
from VRA coverage as a “political subdivision” under section 5.36 In the
alternative, it argued that the VRA’s preclearance provision was unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress’s powers under the Fifteenth Amendment.37
At oral argument, the Justices seemed troubled by the Fifteenth Amendment issue, questioning the continued validity of a preclearance coverage
formula that used data from elections held in 1964, 1968, and 1972.38 The Court
ultimately issued an opinion that reflected that concern: The opinion opened
with a detailed discussion of the serious constitutional questions raised by
section 5, noting that the VRA “differentiates between the States, despite our
historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty’” and opining that
“[t]he evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the
jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”39 But the Court then pivoted,
invoking the avoidance canon and observing that “judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is ‘the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is
called on to perform.’”40 “Our usual practice,” it declared, “is to avoid the
unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions.”41 In the end, the Court
decided, by an 8-1 vote, that the utility district qualified for bailout as a
“political subdivision”42—thus eliminating the need to decide the constitutionality of section 5’s preclearance procedure. Only Justice Thomas disagreed. He
authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that the
constitutional question should not be avoided and that the preclearance
provision should be invalidated.43

36.
37.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(a), 96 Stat. 131, 131 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 10303); Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 4, 120 Stat.
577, 580 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(8)), invalidated in part by Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see also, e.g., Hasen, supra note 14, at 196.
See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 200-01; see also 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1)(A).
See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 197-98, 200-01; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race . . . .”); id. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-40, Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. 193 (No. 08-322), 2009
WL 1146055. The 1975 renewal of the VRA set November 1, 1972, as the date for
measuring voter participation, see Act of Aug. 6, 1975, § 202, 89 Stat. at 401, but the 1982
and 2006 renewals did not update the formula.
Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960)).
See id. at 204-05 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (opinion of
Holmes, J.)).
Id. at 197.
See id. at 208-11.
See id. at 212 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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The Court’s reading was a stunning construction of section 5—one that
required significant straining of the statute’s text. The VRA explicitly defined
“political subdivision” to mean “any county or parish” or, in certain cases, “any
other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”44 The
utility district plainly was not a “county” or a “parish,” nor did it “conduct its
own voter registration.”45 Moreover, the legislative history and structure of
the VRA made clear that the utility district was not eligible for bailout under
the statute.46 Yet the Court concluded that the VRA’s definition of “political
subdivision” did not apply to the bailout provision because Congress added that
provision in a 1982 amendment designed precisely to allow “piecemeal” bailout
by jurisdictions that were located in covered states but lacked any history of
voting discrimination.47 As other scholars have noted, there was nothing in the
text or legislative history of the 1982 amendments to support this argument,
and more than a little to contradict it.48 The Court then proceeded to conclude,
unencumbered by the statutory definition, that the utility district qualified as a
political subdivision of a covered state.49 This was far from a traditional,
straightforward statutory construction: The Court essentially eliminated an
unhelpful definition by fiat in order to avoid deciding the constitutionality of
the preclearance provision.
2.

Skilling v. United States

In Skilling v. United States, the Court considered a statute that Congress
enacted to override McNally v. United States, a Rehnquist Court decision that
44. Id. at 206 (majority opinion) (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,

§ 14(c)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 445 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(2) (2017))).
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 57 n.192 (1982) (“Towns and cities within counties may

not bailout separately. This is a logistical limit . . . . [I]f every political subdivision were
eligible to seek separate bailout, we could not expect that the Justice Department or
private groups could remotely hope to monitor and to defend the bailout suits.”).
47. See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 209-10; see also Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-205, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 131, 131-33 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303).
48. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights
Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 747 (2009) (highlighting that the text and legislative
history “strongly suggested” that the utility district was not a political subdivision
eligible for bailout); Hasen, supra note 14, at 205 (explaining that the Court’s reasoning
was “not at all supportable by the text of the statute or the legislative history”);
The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading Cases: Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 362,
367 (2009) (arguing that the legislative history of the 1982 VRA amendments demonstrates that the Court’s reading was unjustified); see also, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-417, at
57 n.192; H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 2 (1981) (providing that only those political subdivisions separately designated for coverage are eligible for bailout).
49. See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 206, 209-10.
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had held that the mail fraud statute does not cover acts that deprive the public
of the intangible right to receive honest services, such as bribery and kickback
schemes.50 McNally had displaced scores of lower court cases that had construed
the mail and wire fraud statutes to cover precisely the kind of kickbacks at
issue in the case.51 Congress quickly overrode McNally, expressly providing
that for purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes, “the term ‘scheme or
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services.”52
Jeffrey Skilling was an Enron executive accused of investment fraud
under the new honest services statute; he challenged the new law as
unconstitutionally vague.53 In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court “acknowledge[d] that Skilling’s vagueness challenge has force” but
invoked the avoidance canon, noting that “[i]t has long been our practice,
however, before striking a federal statute as impermissibly vague, to consider
whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction.”54
Unlike the opinion in Northwest Austin, the Skilling majority opinion did
not discuss the vagueness problem at length. Instead, it merely noted that
“honest-services decisions preceding McNally were not models of clarity or
consistency,” that “there was considerable disarray” regarding the statute’s
application to conduct other than “bribery and kickback schemes,” and that the
statute’s broad “honest services” language thus raised serious vagueness
concerns.55
Rather than decide the vagueness question head-on, however, the Court
invoked the avoidance canon and essentially rewrote the statute. The Court
first observed that the history of interactions between the Court and Congress
had demonstrated that Congress intended the new statute “to refer to and
incorporate the honest-services doctrine recognized in Courts of Appeals’
decisions before McNally derailed the intangible-rights theory of fraud.”56
50. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 399-402 (2010); see also McNally v. United

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

States, 483 U.S. 350, 356, 360-61 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(2017)). The Court in McNally had cited vagueness and federalism concerns, explaining
that “[r]ather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials,” it would read the statute “as limited in
scope to the protection of property rights.” See 483 U.S. at 360.
See 483 U.S. at 362-63, 362 n.1, 363 n.2, 368, 376-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7603(a), 102 Stat. at 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346).
See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 368-69, 402-03.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Id. at 404.
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It then found that “the ‘vast majority’ of the honest-services cases [before
McNally] involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated
in bribery or kickback schemes”—and concluded that such offenses therefore
constituted the core of the honest services doctrine recognized before
McNally.57 In order to “preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional limitations,” the Court then read the new law to criminalize only the bribery
and kickback core of the pre-McNally case law, and not to apply to investment
frauds such as the one committed by Skilling.58 In so doing, the Court
unabashedly rewrote the statute, significantly trimming its scope—from
covering all “honest services” fraud to covering only bribery and kickback
schemes—in order to save it from constitutional invalidation.59 The Court in
Skilling did not engage the constitutional issue in depth, as it had in Northwest
Austin, but its rewrite of the statutory language was even more brazen than in
Northwest Austin—and equally candid.
3.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), the Court
was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate,
which required individuals to purchase a health insurance policy providing a
minimum level of coverage or be forced to pay a penalty to the IRS when filing
their income taxes.60 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the mandate
exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause, engaging in an extensive discussion of these
constitutional issues.61 He then pivoted—once again invoking the avoidance
canon—to uphold the mandate under Congress’s taxing power. The Chief
Justice openly acknowledged that “[t]he most straightforward reading of the
mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance,” not that it
taxes them for failing to do so.62 But he also insisted that “[t]he question is not
whether [the tax reading] is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but
57. See id. at 404-07 (quoting United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1987),

rev’d en banc, 877 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1989)).
58. See id. at 408-11.
59. See id. at 412 (“Interpreted to encompass only bribery and kickback schemes, § 1346 is

not unconstitutionally vague.”).
60. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 538-40 (2012); see also

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b), 124 Stat. 119,
244-49 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2017)).
61. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 547-61 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(giving Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States”);
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers”).
62. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 562 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”63 As Chief Justice Roberts explained,
“every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute
from unconstitutionality.”64 With this as the baseline, he then construed the
mandate to merely “establish[] a condition—not owning health insurance—that
triggers a tax,” and to hold that under this reading, “the mandate is not a legal
command to buy insurance.”65
As the Court had done in Northwest Austin and Skilling, Chief Justice
Roberts strained and reinterpreted the statute in order to save it from
constitutional invalidation. Moreover, the Chief Justice was explicit about his
strained reading, explaining that “the statute reads more naturally as a
command to buy insurance than as a tax,” and that “it is only because we have a
duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that [the mandate] can be
interpreted as a tax.”66
* * *
Several other cases decided during the Roberts Court’s early Terms also
relied openly on the avoidance canon and, in so doing, engaged in frank
discussion of the relevant constitutional issues.67 None of these cases involved
63. Id. at 563 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
64. Id. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 574. Chief Justice Roberts advocated similar avoidance-based rewriting in his

dissenting opinion in Boumediene v. Bush. See 553 U.S. 723, 822 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). Boumediene involved provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and
the Military Commissions Act (MCA) which prohibited alien detainees classified as
enemy combatants from filing habeas corpus petitions in federal court. See Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2017)); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e)). The majority in Boumediene held that the alternative procedures for
reviewing detentions provided in the DTA were not “an adequate and effective
substitute for habeas corpus,” and thus the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in the
DTA and the MCA contravened the Constitution’s Suspension Clause. See 553 U.S. at
735-36, 771, 795; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”); Detainee Treatment Act § 1005, 119 Stat. at 2740-44
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, by contrast, advocated reading the DTA to
include certain legal protections not specifically listed in the statute—such as an
authorization for the D.C. Circuit to order prisoner release—in order to make the
DTA’s detention review procedures an adequate replacement for habeas corpus. See
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 822-24 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Citing the avoidance canon, he
argued that “[t]o avoid constitutional infirmity, it is reasonable to imply more” legal
protections. See id. at 822.
67. In Gonzales v. Carhart, for example, the Court used the avoidance canon to uphold the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. See 550 U.S. 124, 132, 153-54 (2007); see also
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at
footnote continued on next page
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judicial rewriting of the statute at issue; indeed, the Court (or the concurring or
dissenting opinion) in these cases characterized itself as choosing between two
plausible readings of the statute.68 But taken together with Northwest Austin,
Skilling, and NFIB, these other, less aggressive avoidance cases demonstrate a
pattern in the early Roberts Court of regular reliance on the avoidance canon
and of frank discussion of the constitutional issues when invoking the canon.

18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2017)). The statute was enacted after the Court had invalidated a
Nebraska partial-birth abortion law in an earlier case on the grounds that the state
statute was so broadly worded that it not only prohibited partial-birth abortions but
also imposed an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose another common
abortion procedure. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22, 929-31 (2000). The
federal Act’s challengers argued that it was void for vagueness because, like the
Nebraska statute, it was unclear whether it reached procedures other than the “partial
birth” procedure. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 148-49. A majority of the Court interpreted
the Act to cover only the “partial birth” procedure, noting numerous places in which
the Act deliberately differed from the Nebraska statute and arguing that the avoidance
canon “extinguishes any lingering doubt” because it requires that “every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”
See id. at 148-54 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
Similarly, in Bartlett v. Strickland, a VRA case, the three Justices in the plurality held
that interpreting the VRA to require crossover voting districts “would unnecessarily
infuse race into virtually every redistricting” and cause a “substantial increase in the
number of mandatory districts drawn with race as ‘the predominant factor motivating
the legislature’s decision’”—and that this in turn would pose “serious constitutional
questions.” See 556 U.S. 1, 21-22 (2009) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (first quoting League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.); then quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); and then quoting
LULAC, 548 U.S. at 446 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)).
For other early-Term cases in which the Court (or the concurring or dissenting
opinion) openly invoked the avoidance canon, see Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S.
432, 450 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &
Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 623 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 565-67 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); and Hawaii v. Office of
Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 176 (2009).
68. See, e.g., Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is our settled policy to avoid
an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable
alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question.” (quoting Gomez v. United
States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989))); Jerman, 559 U.S. at 623 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(similar); Fox, 556 U.S. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying the avoidance canon to
reject “a plausible but constitutionally suspect interpretation of a statute”); Office of
Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. at 176 (noting that the avoidance canon “is a tool for choosing
between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text” (quoting Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005))); Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 21 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
(similar).
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B. Critical Response
The early Roberts Court’s penchant for employing the avoidance canon
did not go unnoticed by scholars and commentators. Several newspaper and
scholarly articles highlighted the Court’s use of avoidance—and sharply
criticized it for distorting the canon into a tool for brazenly rewriting statutes
to achieve particular outcomes. Journalists and commentators in online
forums, for example, reproved the Court for its aggressive use of the avoidance
canon, calling its reading of the VRA in Northwest Austin “implausible”69 and
labeling Chief Justice Roberts’s avoidance construction in NFIB “remarkable”
and of “unprecedented uniqueness.”70 Other observers accused the Court of
“stealth judicial overreach.”71
Several scholars also attacked the Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance
canon in law reviews. Richard Hasen opined that the Court was using the
canon “strategically” to “give[] the public appearance of . . . moving moderately
and slowly” while laying the foundation for conservative constitutional
change.72 Richard Re similarly warned that in the hands of the Roberts Court,
“avoidance has become an important tool of judicial empowerment” in lieu of
“a cornerstone principle of judicial restraint.”73 More recently, Neal Katyal and
Thomas Schmidt accused the Court of using the avoidance canon to adopt
“statutory interpretations that would be unthinkable in the absence of the
canon.”74 There were two strands to this scholarly criticism: (1) that the Court
was overreaching by rewriting plain statutory text; and (2) that the Court was
overreaching by engaging in extensive discussions of the constitutional

69. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Down the Memory Hole, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009),

https://perma.cc/69YQ-F4S8.
70. See Randy Barnett, The Unprecedented Uniqueness of Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion, VOLOKH

71.
72.

73.
74.

CONSPIRACY (July 5, 2012, 5:14 PM), https://perma.cc/L8ZJ-H7XC (capitalization
altered).
See, e.g., ALL. FOR JUSTICE, THE ROBERTS COURT AND JUDICIAL OVERREACH 6-9 (2013),
https://perma.cc/9FHA-3TM6.
See Hasen, supra note 14, at 214-23; see also Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on
Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763, 841-44 (2013) (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion in NFIB revealed him “to be not a humble law applier, but a keen politico-legal
strategist”).
See Re, supra note 15, at 174, 185.
Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2116. For other critical treatments, see, for example,
Ilya Shapiro, Like Eastwood Talking to a Chair: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of the
Obamacare Ruling, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 11-12 (2012); and Molly McQuillen, Note,
The Role of the Avoidance Canon in the Roberts Court and the Implications of Its Inconsistent
Application in the Court’s Decisions, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845, 846-47 (2012) (“[T]he
[Court’s] inconsistent application of the avoidance canon has damaged the doctrine
itself and has put its own legitimacy in jeopardy.”).
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infirmities at issue, essentially providing advisory opinions that laid the
groundwork for later constitutional challenges.75
Perhaps the most visible criticism of the Court’s use of avoidance came
from Justices who did not sign on to the majority opinions in cases such as
Northwest Austin, Skilling, and NFIB. In particular, the joint dissent by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito in NFIB excoriated the Court for
misapplying the canon and distorting the statutory text:
The Court today decides to save a statute Congress did not write. It rules that
what the statute declares to be a requirement with a penalty is instead an option
subject to a tax. . . .
The Court regards its strained statutory interpretation as judicial modesty. It is
not. It amounts instead to a vast judicial overreaching.76

The late Justice Scalia issued a similar invective against the majority
opinion in Skilling, calling the Court’s construction “not interpretation but
invention,” and chastising that he “d[id] not believe we have the power, in
order to uphold an enactment, to rewrite it.”77
It is impossible to say with certainty whether the Court, or Chief Justice
Roberts in particular, was aware of the external criticisms from commentators
and scholars. The Justices undoubtedly were aware of the internal controversy
that their use of the avoidance canon stirred in Skilling and NFIB, as dissenting
colleagues expressly denounced their approach. It seems probable that the
Court also was at least generally aware that external commentators had
criticized its use of the avoidance canon—and, indeed, some news reports have
suggested that Chief Justice Roberts pays close attention to media coverage of
the Court.78
Part III below explores the possibility that the Roberts Court’s restraint
toward the avoidance canon in later-Term cases such as Yates may be, at least in
part, a reaction to such external commentary.79 Specifically, it posits that the
Court may be ratcheting down its use of the avoidance canon in order to avoid

75. Thanks to Maggie Lemos for pointing this out.
76. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 706 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,

Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
77. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 422-23 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment).
78. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2,

2012, 9:43 PM), https://perma.cc/V9Z8-E2L2 (reporting that Chief Justice Roberts
“pays attention to media coverage” and is concerned about public perception of the
Court).
79. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text; infra Parts II.A.1, III.A.
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the kind of criticism that followed its prominent early use of the canon. This
seems particularly plausible because there is evidence that the Court, or at least
Chief Justice Roberts, employed avoidance in early-Term cases precisely in
order to preserve the Court’s reputation and legitimacy.
II. Recent Cases: Passive Avoidance
As elaborated in the previous Part, during its early Terms the Roberts
Court openly embraced the canon of constitutional avoidance. A number of its
opinions placed the constitutional difficulty created by a proposed
interpretation front and center, engaging in considerable, often lengthy,
discussion of the constitutional issue before ultimately rewriting the statute to
avoid it. Even in those of its early-Term opinions that employed the so-called
“modern” form of avoidance,80 the Court nearly always discussed the
constitutional difficulty openly and seriously—the constitutional issue was not
merely mentioned as a throwaway argument.81
In the Court’s recent Terms, by contrast, its approach to the avoidance
canon has changed dramatically. Only one majority opinion in a statutory case
decided between 2012 and 2017 has provided a serious discussion of the
constitutional issue in the case.82 Moreover, in only one case has the Court
strained the text of the statute at issue in a way comparable to what it did in
Northwest Austin, Skilling, and NFIB—and that case relied primarily on a
80. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
81. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510-12, 526 (2011); Hawaii v. Office of Haw. Affairs, 556

U.S. 163, 176 (2009); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21-23 (2009) (opinion of
Kennedy, J.); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153-54 (2007).
Some dissenting opinions, however, did make only passing mention of the
constitutional issue. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559
U.S. 573, 623 (2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 565-66 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v.
Hanson, 550 U.S. 511, 514 (2007).
Additionally, two of the early cases incorporated by reference lengthy constitutional
discussions from other cases. See Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 395 (2012) (per curiam)
(referencing the “serious constitutional questions” elaborated in Northwest Austin
(quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009)));
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 112-14 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). For the constitutional discussion in Booker,
see 543 U.S. at 230-37.
82. That case was McDonnell v. United States. See 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372-73 (2016); see also infra
Appendix. Three other opinions, all authored by Justice Thomas, also seriously
engaged the constitutional issue—but none were joined by any other Justice. See
Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2082-85 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2566-71 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2263-68 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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different canon of construction, mentioning avoidance only in passing.83 This
is despite the fact that serious constitutional concerns have been implicated in
several of the statutory interpretation cases the Court has decided during this
period—and despite the fact that those constitutional issues have been squarely
discussed in the briefs as well as at oral argument.84 For comparison’s sake, in
the seven-year period between 2006 and 2012, there were only two cases in
which avoidance arguments raised in the briefs and discussed at oral argument
were ignored in a majority opinion that adopted the reading advocated by the
party invoking avoidance.85 By contrast, in the five-year period between 2013
and 2017, there were seven such cases.86
83. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-93 (2014) (relying primarily on the

federalism clear statement principle).
84. See sources cited supra note 18.
85. See United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,

Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). As explained below, Denedo and Tellabs differ from the cases
discussed in this Part. In Denedo, the Justices expressed skepticism about the seriousness
of the constitutional difficulty at oral argument, and in Tellabs, the Court’s opinion
expressly rejected the constitutional concerns raised, eliminating any need to invoke
the avoidance canon. See infra note 206.
86. See Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017); Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2001 (2015); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of
Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014); CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Maslenjak, see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 53-54, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (No. 16-309), 2017 WL 1495528; Brief for
Petitioner at 29-30, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (No. 16-309), 2017 WL 818305; and Brief
for the United States at 35-36, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (No. 16-309), 2017 WL 1175619.
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Elonis, see Elonis Oral Argument, supra
note 18, at 46-47; and Elonis Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 18, at 34-61.
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Yates, see Yates Oral Argument, supra
note 3, at 5, 36-37; and Yates Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 18, at 25-28.
For discussion of the constitutional issue in T-Mobile, see Transcript of Oral Argument
at 12, T-Mobile, 135 S. Ct. 808 (No. 13-975), 2014 WL 9866157; and Brief of Respondent at
25, 55-56, T-Mobile, 135 S. Ct. 808 (No. 13-975), 2014 WL 4101233.
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Hobby Lobby, see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 7-10, 43, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356), 2014 WL
1351985; and Brief for the Respondents in No. 13-356, at 32-33, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
2751 (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356), 2014 WL 546900.
For discussion of the constitutional issue in CTS Corp., see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 15, CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2175 (No. 13-339), 2014 WL 1620851; Brief for the
Petitioner at 37-41, CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2175 (No. 13-339), 2014 WL 768313; and Brief
for Respondents at 38-39, CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2175 (No. 13-339), 2014 WL 1260425.
For discussion of the constitutional issue in Adoptive Couple, see Adoptive Couple Oral
Argument, supra note 18, at 26; and Adoptive Couple Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 18, at
43-56.
footnote continued on next page
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Part II.A below highlights several cases in which the Court has conspicuously failed to mention avoidance, despite paying notable attention to it at oral
argument, and despite ultimately construing the statute at issue in a manner
consistent with avoidance. Part II.B below provides a brief overview of the
Court’s passive approach to the avoidance canon in the later-Term cases in
which it has invoked the canon.
A. Avoiding Without Avoidance
The cases discussed below share several characteristics in common. First,
in each case, the most straightforward or “plain” reading of the statute raised
serious constitutional difficulties. Second, in each case, the parties’ briefs clearly
called attention to the constitutional difficulty, and the Justices discussed the
constitutional difficulty—often at length—at oral argument. Third, in each
case, the Court ultimately construed the statute in a manner that avoided the
constitutional difficulty—but did so without mentioning the avoidance canon
(although in one case it mentioned but did not rely on the canon).87 In other
words, the construction ultimately adopted by the Court was not the most
straightforward reading of the statute and at least arguably conflicted with the
statute’s plain meaning, as in the early-Term cases discussed in Part I above—
but the avoidance canon was not the tool the Court used to achieve its end run
around the statute’s text.
Instead, in all but one of the cases discussed below, the Court employed an
alternative interpretive tool in lieu of constitutional avoidance—the rule of
lenity, the federalism clear statement principle, or the “mischief” rule. As
This count does not include Bond v. United States, because the majority opinion in Bond
did mention the constitutional difficulties that would be created by the government’s
interpretation and gestured vaguely at avoidance. See 134 S. Ct. at 2093-94. Nor does it
include King v. Burwell, because the avoidance argument in King was raised by an
amicus brief and not by the parties. See King JALSA Brief, supra note 18, at 3-6; King
States’ Brief, supra note 18, at 42-43; see also infra Part II.A.5. My research assistants and I
did not review amicus briefs for the other statutory cases decided during the Terms
studied, so in order to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison across time periods, King
was omitted.
87. Indeed, in two of the cases—Yates and Adoptive Couple—the Court did not so much as
acknowledge the constitutional difficulty. In Bond, the Court did mention the
avoidance canon, but only briefly, and it barely discussed the constitutional issue, see
134 S. Ct. at 2087-88, instead resting its construction primarily on the federalism clear
statement principle, see id. at 2087-94, a close cousin of avoidance that requires less of a
deep dive into murky constitutional questions, see infra Part III.B.1. Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion, by contrast, would have decided the constitutional issue—and
invalidated the statute. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). In Elonis, the Court engaged in no discussion of the constitutional issue or
the avoidance canon, merely stating that it was “not necessary to consider” the issue
given the Court’s disposition of the case. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
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discussed below, the “mischief” rule enables the Court to claim fidelity to
Congress’s intent despite choosing a construction that conflicts with the
statute’s apparent plain meaning.88 The rule of lenity and the federalism clear
statement principle are canons based in constitutional law that can be
considered part of an “avoidance penumbra,”89 but that do not require extended
discussion or resolution of the constitutional issues raised. It is possible to view
such rules as essentially alternate versions of the avoidance canon, given their
origins in constitutional law. However, as elaborated below, the rule of lenity
and the federalism clear statement principle differ in important ways from the
avoidance canon, both because they do not require serious engagement with
the underlying constitutional issue or a determination of probable
constitutional infirmity, and because they do not empower the Court to
effectively rewrite the statutory text.90
1.

Yates v. United States

As noted in the Introduction, Yates v. United States91 is a case that squarely
implicates the avoidance canon, and one in which we would expect to see some
discussion of the need to avoid a serious vagueness problem. The case involved
a commercial fisherman who caught undersized red grouper in violation of
federal conservation regulations.92 A federal agent cited Yates for the violation
and instructed him to keep the undersized fish segregated from the rest of the
catch until the ship returned to port.93 Yates instead told a crew member to
throw the undersized fish overboard.94 For this offense, Yates was charged
with “destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a
federal investigation” under an evidence-tampering statute enacted as part of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.95 The statutory question at issue was whether a fish is
a “tangible object” within the meaning of the statute, which provides criminal
liability for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals,

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.1. Many thanks to Bill Eskridge for suggesting this label.
See infra Part III.B.1.
135 S. Ct. 1074.
See id. at 1078-79 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 1079.
See id. at 1080.
See id.; see also Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, tit. VIII, sec. 802, § 1519, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519
(2017)).

536

Passive Avoidance
71 STAN. L. REV. 513 (2019)

covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence [an] investigation.”96
Yates’s brief argued that the term “tangible object” should be read in
context to encompass only objects that are used to preserve information.97
A broader reading, he claimed, was problematic because it would create
vagueness and due process problems, rendering the statute’s reach so indefinite
that it would permit “standardless sweep[s]”98 that could lead to “arbitrary and
discriminatory prosecutions” and deprive citizens of “fair notice” regarding the
conduct that is covered under the statute.99 Yates’s brief expressly invoked the
avoidance canon as well as the rule of lenity, urging the Court to limit the
statute’s reach.100
At oral argument, Justices Kennedy and Breyer both appeared troubled by
the vagueness issue.101 Several Justices also expressed concern about the related
problems of overcriminalization and excessive punishment.102 Yet while the
Court ultimately ruled in favor of Yates—construing the statute at issue to

96. 18 U.S.C. § 1519; see Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1078-79 (plurality opinion); supra text
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.

accompanying note 1.
See Yates Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 18, at 25-28.
See id. at 26-27 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
See id. at 25-26 (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010)).
See id. at 25.
See Yates Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 5 (Justice Kennedy: “[I]t seems to me that the
test you suggest has almost more problems with vagueness, more problems with
determining what its boundaries are than the government’s test.”); id. at 36 (Justice
Breyer: “[I]f you can’t draw a line, it seems to me that the risk of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is a real one. And if that’s a real risk, you fall within the
vagueness doctrine.”).
See, e.g., id. at 5 (Justice Kennedy: “[T]he argument that you make has considerable force
about over criminalizing . . . .”); id. at 26 (Justice Scalia: “Is there any other provision of
Federal law that has a lesser penalty than 20 years that could have been applied to . . .
this captain throwing a fish overboard?”); id. at 28 (Justice Ginsburg: “[T]he code is filled
with overlapping offenses. So here’s a case where the one statute has a 5‐year maximum, the other 20. The one that has the 5-year clearly covers the situation. Is there
anything in any kind of manual in the Department of Justice that instructs U.S.
attorneys what to do when there are these overlapping statutes?”); id. at 31 (Chief
Justice Roberts: “It’s an extraordinary leverage that the broadest interpretation of this
statute would give Federal prosecutors.”); id. at 50 (Justice Alito: “[T]his statute, as you
read it, is capable of being applied to really trivial matters, and yet each of those would
carry a potential penalty of 20 years . . . .”).
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cover only those tangible objects that are “used to record or preserve
information”103—the plurality opinion puzzlingly failed to mention either the
vagueness problem or the avoidance canon.104
This omission is particularly noteworthy because in Johnson v. United States,
a case decided during the same Term as Yates, the Court held that a sentencing
enhancement provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague.105 Johnson demonstrates that vagueness in criminal statutes is a
constitutional infirmity that the Roberts Court takes seriously—so the Court’s
failure to mention vagueness in Yates, even while it limited the reach of the
evidence-tampering statute in a manner that eliminated the vagueness
problem, is conspicuous.
In place of avoidance, the Yates plurality instead relied heavily on two
other text-defeating interpretive tools—the “mischief” that the statute was
designed to address106 and the rule of lenity. The plurality’s analysis began by
103. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (plurality opinion); see also id. at

1089-90 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. To be fair, there were procedural problems with the vagueness argument, as Yates had

not raised the argument below. See Yates Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 17 (Justice
Breyer: “[W]here you end up . . . is that this is void for vagueness, but not for any reason
you have yet told us. So what am I to do with the fact, if that is a serious problem, that it
has never been argued in this case?”). But the Roberts Court has been willing to
overlook similar procedural problems in other cases. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013) (noting that the Court had ordered reargument
addressing a new question); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367-68 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for
ruling on a question that “is not before the Court”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 323 (2010) (“Citizens United raises this issue for the first time before us, but we
consider the issue because ‘it was addressed by the court below.’” (quoting Lebron v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995))). Indeed, it has at times ordered
additional briefing after oral argument to address important issues not raised by the
parties at all in the initial briefing. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 396-98 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the “Court should not be
deciding” the constitutional question because it “was not properly brought before us”).
105. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015); see also Career Criminals
Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, subtitle I, § 1402(b), 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-39 to -40 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (2017)).
106. The “mischief” rule dates back to a sixteenth-century decision by the English Court of
Exchequer. See Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7a. The court directed:
[T]hat for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes . . . four things are to be discerned and
considered:—
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3rd[.] What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief . . . .

Id. at 638, 3 Co. Rep. at 7b (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

538

Passive Avoidance
71 STAN. L. REV. 513 (2019)

noting that the statute at issue was enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and was “designed to protect investors and restore trust in financial markets
following the collapse of Enron.”107 It observed that prior to Sarbanes-Oxley,
there was a “conspicuous omission” in the law regarding document destruction
and that the provision at issue was enacted to cure that omission.108 The
plurality reasoned that “it would cut [the statute] loose from its financial-fraud
mooring to hold that it encompasses any and all objects, whatever their size or
significance, destroyed with obstructive intent.”109 Instead, it concluded that
because “Congress trained its attention on corporate and accounting deception
and cover-ups,” it made sense to adopt “a matching construction” of the
statute.110 And the plurality faulted the government’s construction for
extending the statute “beyond the principal evil motivating its passage.”111 In
other words, the plurality used the history behind the statute to establish its
core coverage (document destruction)—and to argue that the application at
issue in the case (destroying fish) did not fall within that core.
The Yates plurality also invoked the rule of lenity, arguing that in the end,
“if our recourse to traditional tools of statutory construction leaves any doubt
about the meaning of ‘tangible object,’ . . . we would invoke the rule that
‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity.’”112 The rule of lenity was particularly applicable, the plurality
maintained, because the government urged a reading of the statute that would
expose defendants to twenty-year sentences “for tampering with any physical
object that might have evidentiary value in any federal investigation into any
offense, no matter whether the investigation is pending or merely contemplated, or whether the offense subject to investigation is criminal or civil.”113 Thus
the rule of lenity, rather than the avoidance canon, became the plurality’s
vehicle for addressing the vagueness, overcriminalization, and excessive
punishment problems discussed at oral argument.
Yates seems like a classic case for invoking the avoidance canon. The
phrase “tangible object” is broad and appears to cover all objects that are
capable of being touched, including fish. Yet a plurality of the Court tweaked
the statute to avoid this reading, effectively adding the limitation “used to
record or preserve information” to the statutory term “tangible object.”114 In so
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 1081.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
See id. at 1081.
Id. at 1088 (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000)).
Id.
See id. at 1079.
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doing, the plurality avoided potential overbreadth and vagueness problems
highlighted by the parties’ briefs and the Justices’ questions at oral argument,
much as it did when it construed the honest services statute in Skilling to cover
only bribery and kickback schemes.115 But whereas in Skilling the Court was
open about the fact that it was trimming the statute’s scope in order to avoid a
vagueness problem,116 the Yates plurality curtailed the statute’s reach without
referencing the avoidance canon or discussing the vagueness problem—and
without acknowledging that it was, in effect, tweaking the statute’s scope.
Indeed, the Yates plurality characterized the “used to record or preserve
information” interpretation as the one dictated by the statute’s text and
structure, rather than as a second-best reading adopted by the Court in order to
avoid a constitutional violation.117
2.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl

A second later-Term case that conspicuously failed to invoke avoidance is
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.118 Adoptive Couple involved the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), which establishes federal standards for state court child
custody proceedings that concern Indian children.119 One provision of ICWA
bars the involuntary termination of an Indian parent’s rights with respect to
his child absent a heightened showing that serious harm to the Indian child is
likely to result from the parent’s “continued custody.”120 The case raised the
question whether the termination bar applies to an unwed biological father
who never had custody of his child (and who had relinquished custody to the
birth mother during pregnancy), but who changed his mind upon learning that
a non-Indian couple was to adopt the child.121

115. See supra Part I.A.2.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
117. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081-87 (plurality opinion) (invoking numerous “traditional tools

118.
119.
120.
121.

of statutory interpretation” to conclude that “an aggressive interpretation of ‘tangible
object’ must be rejected”).
133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
See Pub. L. No. 95-608, tit. I, 92 Stat. 3069, 3071-75 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1923
(2017)).
See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558-59. The birth mother and biological father ended
their relationship while the mother was pregnant; at that time the father, a member of
the Cherokee Nation, agreed to relinquish his parental rights. Id. at 2558. He provided
no financial support for the birth mother or child during the pregnancy or the first
four months after the baby was born. Id. While pregnant, the birth mother arranged to
have the child adopted by a non-Indian couple; when the couple served the biological
father with notice of the pending adoption, he sought custody. See id. at 2558-59.
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Like the petitioner in Yates, the adoptive couple argued that construing
ICWA to prevent termination of the unwed biological father’s parental rights
would render the statute unconstitutional.122 The couple’s brief argued that
such a construction would (1) violate the Equal Protection Clause by treating
Indian children differently from other children based solely on “ancestral”
classification,123 (2) conflict with the birth mother’s substantive due process
rights,124 and (3) violate federalism principles by allowing the federal
government to create a new class of parents and new substantive parental
rights that directly conflict with state law.125 The adoptive couple’s brief
squarely invoked the avoidance canon and urged the Court to adopt a different
construction “if fairly possible.”126
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy expressed concern about the constitutional tensions created by ICWA and openly wondered whether the Court
would have to “rely on constitutional avoidance” and “rewrite the statute.”127
Justice Alito also specifically highlighted the federalism problems created by
the statute.128 However, as in Yates, the opinion ultimately issued by the Court
failed to mention the avoidance canon or the federalism issue. Further, it made
only one opaque reference to the equal protection issue—even though it
construed the statute not to cover parents who never had custody of the child,
and thereby evaded the potential constitutional problem.129 Only Justice
Thomas’s solo concurrence addressed the federalism issues, invoking the
avoidance canon to justify a reading that placed the father beyond the statute’s
coverage.130
Instead of avoidance, the majority opinion in Adoptive Couple, like the
plurality opinion in Yates, placed heavy emphasis on the “mischief” that
prompted Congress to enact ICWA. The opinion began its statutory analysis
122. See Adoptive Couple Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 18, at 43-51.
123. See id. at 44-47.
124. See id. at 47-49.
125. See id. at 49-51.
126. See id. at 43 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998)); see

127.
128.

129.

130.

also Reply Brief for Petitioners at 15-23, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399),
2013 WL 1411847.
See Adoptive Couple Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 26.
See id. at 53 (Justice Alito: “Well, family law is traditionally a State province, but your
argument is that Federal law can take a traditional family law term like ‘parent’ and
perhaps others and give it a meaning that is very different from its traditional meaning
or its meaning under State law?”).
The third-to-last sentence of the Adoptive Couple majority opinion did acknowledge in
passing that the construction urged by the father “would raise equal protection
concerns,” but it argued that the “plain text” of the statute did not support that reading.
See 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
See id. at 2565-71 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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by explaining that ICWA was enacted in response to “rising concern in the
mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and
Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation
of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.”131 The
statute’s provisions, the Court observed, were designed to prevent the
“wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes.”132 The Court
reasoned that a child who has never lived with her Indian parent cannot be
“removed” from that parent and that ICWA therefore does not prevent the
termination of parental rights in such situations.133 “[T]he primary mischief
the ICWA was designed to counteract was the unwarranted removal of Indian
children from Indian families,” the Court argued.134 But where the adoption of
the Indian child is lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial
rights, “ICWA’s primary goal of preventing the unwarranted removal of
Indian children and the dissolution of Indian families is not implicated.”135
Adoptive Couple, too, seems like a classic avoidance case. On its face, ICWA
appears clearly to protect the parental rights of unwed biological fathers,
including those who have never had custody of their children. The statute’s
definitions section explicitly defines “parent” as “any biological parent or
parents of an Indian child.”136 And the provision at issue explicitly provides
that “[n]o termination of parental rights may be ordered in [a child custody]
proceeding in the absence of a determination . . . that the continued custody of
the child by the parent . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child.”137 But the Court effectively added the qualification “who
currently or previously has had custody of the child” to the definition of
“parent.” As was pointed out in the briefs, at oral argument, and in Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion, there were compelling constitutional concerns
that may have justified such a statutory revision. But the Court’s opinion
conspicuously failed to mention them. It also failed to mention the avoidance
canon, or to acknowledge that its construction in any way tweaked the
antitermination provision or deviated from the provision’s most straightforward reading.

131. Id. at 2557 (majority opinion) (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

U.S. 30, 32 (1989)).
See id. (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 32).
See id. at 2560-62.
Id. at 2561.
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2017).
Id. § 1912(f).
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3.

Bond v. United States

Bond v. United States presented an unusual set of facts: Carol Bond sought
revenge against her husband’s paramour by spreading toxic chemicals on the
paramour’s car, mailbox, and doorknob.138 The paramour suffered a minor
chemical burn on her thumb, which she treated by rinsing with water, and was
otherwise unharmed.139 The federal government charged Bond with violating
a federal statute that implements the Chemical Weapons Convention.140 The
implementing statute makes it unlawful for “any person knowingly” to “use, or
threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”141
Like the defendant in Yates and the adoptive parents in Adoptive Couple,
Bond argued that there were serious constitutional problems with construing
the implementing statute to cover her conduct. Specifically, Bond’s brief
argued that if the statute were interpreted broadly to make every malicious use
of chemicals a crime—rather than just those uses that are warlike—the statute
would exceed Congress’s enumerated powers,142 impinge on states’ police
powers,143 and fail to qualify as a necessary and proper means of executing the
federal government’s treatymaking power.144 Her brief expressly invoked the
avoidance canon, urging the Court to limit the statute’s reach in order to avoid
triggering such constitutional infirmities.145
At oral argument, the Justices’ questioning focused almost entirely on the
constitutional issues raised by the implementing statute. Several Justices
expressed concern that the government’s proposed reading would violate
federalism principles and give Congress too much power to use treaty
implementation statutes to regulate matters it otherwise lacked power to
regulate.146
138. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014).
139. See id.
140. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and

141.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21 (1996), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
See Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
div. I, sec. 201(a), § 229(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-866 to -867 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 229(a)(1) (2017)).
See Bond Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 18, at 20-23.
See id. at 24-27.
See id. at 27-38.
See id. at 42-46.
See Bond Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 31 (Chief Justice Roberts: “[T]he purpose of
my hypothetical was [to] try to find out if there’s any situation in which you believe an
erosion or intrusion by the Federal government on the police power could be a
constraint against an international treaty.”); id. at 32-33 (Justice Scalia: “I think there is a
big difference between just doing it through a self-executing treaty and dragging the
Congress into . . . areas where it has never been before.”); id. at 44 (Chief Justice Roberts:
footnote continued on next page
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In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, a majority of the Court ultimately
adopted the construction that Bond advocated, reading the Chemical Weapons
Convention’s implementing statute not to cover Bond’s local assault on a
romantic rival.147 This time, unlike in Adoptive Couple, the majority opinion did
mention both the avoidance canon and the constitutional issues.148 But it did so
without engaging in the kind of extended analysis that characterized its use of
avoidance in early-Term cases such as Northwest Austin and NFIB.149 Rather, the
Court merely laid out the parties’ opposing positions regarding Congress’s power
to enact criminal statutes in connection with its treaty power, and then declared
that “[n]otwithstanding this debate, it is ‘a well-established principle . . . that
normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some
other ground upon which to dispose of the case.’”150 This formulation is not,
strictly speaking, a statement of the avoidance canon, but rather a statement of a
related procedural doctrine called the “last resort rule.”151
Even if we count this as essentially an invocation of the avoidance canon,
what the Court did next departed substantially from its approach in earlyTerm avoidance cases. That is, instead of engaging in a serious analysis of the
federalism issues and concluding that the statute would indeed violate (or come
close to violating) federalism principles if read to cover Bond’s conduct, the
Court simply observed that “Bond argues that [the statute] does not cover her

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

“I just would like a fairly precise answer whether there are or are not limitations on
what Congress can do with respect to the police power. If their authority is asserted
under a treaty, is their . . . power to intrude upon the police power unlimited?”); id. at 45
(Chief Justice Roberts: “I can imagine treaties that you would say are within the treaty
power, . . . but that could give rise to implementing legislation that I think would be
extraordinary from the point of view of the framers and the power that it gave
Congress to intrude upon State authority.”); id. at 49 (Justice Breyer: “[Y]our position
constitutionally would allow the President and the Senate . . . to do anything through a
treaty that is not specifically within the prohibitions of the rights protections of the
Constitution. . . . And I doubt that . . . the Framers intended to allow the President and
the Senate to do anything.”).
See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (2014).
See id. at 2087-88.
See supra Parts I.A.1, .3.
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984)
(per curiam)).
See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1014-27
(1994) (noting that Justice Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority articulated both the traditional avoidance canon as well as the “last
resort” rule, directing federal courts to decide constitutional issues only as a “last
resort”—that is, if there is no other ground upon which to rest the judgment); see also
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.”).
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conduct” and then turned to interpreting the statute without further discussing
or resolving the constitutional issues.152 In other words, the Court went into
“ordinary statutory interpretation” mode, rather than “constitutional problem”
mode. First, the Court noted that it was unlikely that the Convention’s
drafters, who designed the Convention in response to war crimes and acts of
terrorism, “were interested in anything like Bond’s common law assault.”153
Following this nod to the treaty drafters’ intent, the Court invoked
background principles of statutory construction governing the relationship
between the federal government and the States. It reviewed several precedents
applying presumptions that federal statutes generally do not intrude on state
rights or functions.154 Based on these precedents, the Court invoked the
federalism clear statement principle requiring “a clear indication that Congress
meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive
language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States.”155 Finding
no clear statement that Congress intended for the Convention’s implementing
statute to reach local criminal behavior, it then construed the statute not to
cover Bond’s conduct.156
The Bond majority opinion also relied heavily on the mischief that the
Chemical Weapons Convention was designed to combat. The opinion’s first
few lines invoked scenes of war in which chemical weapons like mustard gas
were unleashed.157 The opinion then recounted the history of international
agreements to prohibit the use of toxic chemicals, culminating in ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention.158 Later, when applying the federalism
clear statement principle to reject a broad construction of the treaty’s
implementing statute, the Court returned to the mischief the statute originally
was designed to address, noting that “[t]he substances that Bond used bear little
152. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087.
153. See id.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See id. at 2088-90.
Id. at 2090.
See id. at 2090-93.
The majority opinion opened as follows:
The horrors of chemical warfare were vividly captured by John Singer Sargent in his 1919
painting Gassed. The nearly life-sized work depicts two lines of soldiers, blinded by mustard
gas, clinging single file to orderlies guiding them to an improvised aid station. . . . The soldiers
were shown staggering through piles of comrades too seriously burned to even join the
procession.
The painting reflects the devastation that Sargent witnessed in the aftermath of the Second
Battle of Arras during World War I. That battle and others like it led to an overwhelming
consensus in the international community that toxic chemicals should never again be used as
weapons against human beings. Today that objective is reflected in the international Convention on Chemical Weapons . . . .

Id. at 2083.
158. See id. at 2083-85.
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resemblance to the deadly toxins” that those who drafted and ratified the
Convention sought to ban, and that “Bond’s crime is worlds apart” from the
kinds of attacks the Convention was meant to target.159
What is striking about the majority opinion in Bond is that although it
mentioned the avoidance canon, it did not rely openly or significantly on the
canon to justify its reading of the implementing statute’s text. That work was
instead done by the federalism clear statement principle and the mischief rule.
Moreover, unlike Northwest Austin and NFIB, the majority opinion in Bond
contained no lengthy exegesis on why the statute would be unconstitutional if
interpreted according to its plain text. Indeed, it dodged the constitutional
question about the scope of Congress’s power to implement treaties, relying
instead on a “lack of clear statement” argument and the related presumption
favoring narrow construction of statutes that regulate areas ordinarily
governed by state law.
Part III below suggests that this is a classic form of “passive avoidance,” in
which the Court uses other interpretive rules connected to constitutional
principles—but that do not require the level of constitutional analysis that the
avoidance canon requires—to decide cases that raise constitutional issues on
narrower grounds.160
4.

Elonis v. United States

Elonis v. United States involved a statute that criminalizes “any communication containing . . . any threat to injure the person of another.”161 Anthony
Elonis was a disgruntled husband and employee who posted “self-styled ‘rap’
lyrics” on Facebook under a pseudonym.162 The lyrics contained graphically
violent language and imagery about his wife, coworkers, a kindergarten class,
and state and federal law enforcement.163 The posts were interspersed with
disclaimers that the lyrics were “fictitious” and proclamations that Elonis was
exercising his First Amendment rights.164
Elonis was eventually arrested and charged with making communications
that contained threats to injure others.165 At trial, he requested a jury
instruction that “the government must prove that he intended to communicate

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 2090-91.
See infra Parts III.A-.B.
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2017); see Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015).
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004-05.
See id. at 2004-07.
See id. at 2005-06.
See id. at 2006-07.
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a true threat” in order to convict him.166 The district court denied his
request.167 The question before the Supreme Court was “whether the statute
also requires that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the
communication, and—if not—whether the First Amendment requires such a
showing.”168
Elonis’s brief argued that his Facebook posts were protected speech under
the First Amendment, and that unless construed to contain a subjective intent
requirement, the statute would be unconstitutional.169 It also expressly
invoked the avoidance canon, urging the Court to construe the statute to
contain an intent requirement in order to avoid the free speech issue.170 At oral
argument, several of the Justices expressed concern about the statute’s First
Amendment implications. Justice Kagan, for example, criticized the
government’s proposed construction, noting that it was “not the kind of
standard that we typically use in the First Amendment.”171 Justice Sotomayor
similarly questioned whether “the First Amendment provide[s] an umbrella
that cabins” the statute’s reach, and pointed out that the Court has “been loathe
to create more exceptions” that remove certain forms of speech from First
Amendment protection.172
In the end, the Court (again in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts)
construed the statute to contain an intent requirement, as Elonis had urged.173
Yet, as in Yates and Adoptive Couple, it did not mention constitutional avoidance
or the First Amendment in so doing. Indeed, the only reference the Court made
to the First Amendment came in its restatement of the question presented and
in its summary comment that “[g]iven our disposition, it is not necessary to
consider any First Amendment issues.”174
Unlike the other cases discussed in this Part, however, the Court in Elonis
did not rely on the mischief that the statute was designed to address in order to
justify its statutory (re)construction. Instead, it cited the common law
principles “that a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ before he can be
found guilty” and that courts “generally ‘interpret[] criminal statutes to include
broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms
166. See id. at 2007 (quoting Joint Appendix at 21, Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (No. 13-983), 2014
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

WL 4357422).
Id.
Id. at 2004.
See Elonis Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 18, at 34-61.
See id. at 31-32.
Elonis Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 46.
Id. at 53.
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
See id. at 2004, 2012.
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does not contain them.’”175 The Court then analogized the statute to other
criminal statutes that had been construed to contain an intent or knowledge
requirement.176 This was a curious approach, however, because a number of
recent Roberts Court cases had refused to construe criminal statutes to contain
an intent or knowledge requirement177—so absent the First Amendment
concerns, it is difficult to explain the decision to treat the statute at issue in
Elonis differently. Although the Elonis majority opinion did not rely on the
mischief rule or on constitutional law-based canons such as the rule of lenity or
the federalism clear statement principle to skirt the constitutional issue—as
had the Court’s opinions in Yates, Adoptive Couple, and Bond—it too sought to
tweak the statute without admitting that it was adding a limitation not found
in the statute’s text.178
Elonis, like Yates, Adoptive Couple, and Bond, seems like a classic case for use
of the avoidance canon. The statute’s plain text contained no intent
requirement, but that reading posed thorny First Amendment problems. The
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, nevertheless read an intent
requirement into the statute—giving the statute something other than its most
straightforward construction. And yet, unlike the opinions in the cases
discussed in Part I above, the Court’s opinion failed to mention avoidance, and
essentially ignored the constitutional issues squarely raised in the briefs and at
oral argument—relying instead on other interpretive tools.
5.

King v. Burwell

A fifth case that further suggests that the post-2012 Roberts Court has
embarked on a more subdued path in its use of constitutional avoidance is
King v. Burwell.179 King, like NFIB, involved the ACA, a health care reform

175. Id. at 2009 (alteration in original) (first quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,

176.
177.

178.

179.

252 (1952); and then quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70
(1994)).
See id. at 2009-10.
See, e.g., Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2387 (2014) (holding that a bank
fraud statute does not require proof that the defendant intended to defraud the bank);
Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 570, 577 (2009) (holding that no intent to discharge a
firearm is required in order to trigger a sentencing enhancement); see also Rosemond v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1246-47 (2014) (concluding that aiding and abetting
liability does not require intent to facilitate all elements of the underlying crime).
One difference is that in Elonis, the tools of passive avoidance the Court used were
common law precedents and other criminal statutes. In other words, rather than seek
to characterize its interpretation as consistent with congressional intent (as reliance on
the mischief rule suggests), the Court sought to justify its interpretation as dictated by
established presumptions in criminal law.
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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statute designed to expand insurance coverage.180 The ACA “requires the
creation of an ‘Exchange’ in each State—basically, a marketplace that allows
people to compare and purchase insurance plans.”181 The statute “gives each
State the opportunity to establish its own Exchange, but provides that the
Federal Government will establish the Exchange if the State does not.”182 The
question presented in King was whether certain tax credits, which the Act
provides to individuals who fall within a specified income range, are available
in states that have a federal exchange rather than one established by the
state.183 The relevant statutory text provides that tax credits “‘shall be allowed’
for any ‘applicable taxpayer’”184 and that “the amount of the tax credit depends
in part on whether the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through ‘an
Exchange established by the State’” under the ACA.185
The most straightforward reading of the statute’s text is that the tax credits
are not available for individuals who purchase insurance from an exchange that
was established by the federal government, because such exchanges are not
“established by the State.” However, two amicus briefs suggested an avoidance
argument that could have been used to save the statute from this construction.186
They argued that if the ACA was read not to provide tax credits to individuals
who purchase insurance from an exchange established by the federal
government, the statute would amount to a congressional threat to send states
that did not establish exchanges into insurance market failure.187 In other words,
it would amount to a congressional attempt to coerce states into establishing
exchanges by threatening the destruction of their health insurance markets if
they did not—and this coercion would raise serious Tenth Amendment
180. See id. at 2485.
181. Id.; see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(b)(1), 124

Stat. 119, 173 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2017)).
182. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485; see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(c)(1), 124

Stat. at 186 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1)).
183. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a),
184.
185.
186.
187.

124 Stat. at 213-19 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2017)).
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i)).
See King States’ Brief, supra note 18, at 42-44; King JALSA Brief, supra note 18, at 36-41.
The tax credits enable people whose income is low enough that they would otherwise
be exempt from the ACA’s individual mandate to purchase insurance. See King, 135
S. Ct. at 2486-87. Thus, if the credits were unavailable to large swaths of low-income
purchasers because they purchased insurance on a federally established exchange, those
individuals would not be required to buy health insurance at all. And if the number of
people purchasing insurance dropped, the cost of premiums would increase for
everyone, which in turn would cause more people to stop purchasing insurance and,
ultimately, would cause insurers to leave the health insurance market. See id. at
2485-86, 2493-94 (discussing this “death spiral” phenomenon).
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concerns.188 This was a novel, highly controversial argument and one that
seemed strategically based on the impression—created by the rulings in Northwest
Austin, Skilling, and NFIB—that the Roberts Court is favorably disposed to
inventive avoidance arguments. Indeed, the principle of equal state sovereignty
articulated in Northwest Austin and the Commerce Clause argument advanced in
NFIB had been similarly unprecedented and controversial.189 Based on the
Court’s early-Term history with the canon, many commentators thought there
was a strong chance the Court might jump at the avoidance “out” once again.190
At oral argument, Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Sotomayor all picked up on
the avoidance argument. Justice Kennedy commented, “[I]f your argument is
accepted, the States are being told either create your own Exchange, or we’ll
send your insurance market into a death spiral.”191 He called this “a serious
constitutional problem.”192 Justice Sotomayor similarly pointed out that if the
Court adopted the challengers’ reading, “we’re going to read a statute as
intruding on the Federal-State relationship, because then the States are going to
be coerced into establishing their own Exchanges.”193 She noted that “if it is
coercive in an unconstitutional way,” the Court’s practice is to “read a statute in
a way where we don’t impinge on the basic Federal-State relationship.”194 Even
Justice Alito, who ultimately agreed with the challengers, inquired, “If we
adopt [the challengers’] interpretation of this Act, is it unconstitutionally
coercive?”195

188. King States’ Brief, supra note 18, at 42-44; King JALSA Brief, supra note 18, at 6-7.
189. See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2133-34 (arguing that the “equal sovereignty”

190.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

doctrine relied on by the Court in Northwest Austin was “at best a radical transformation” of a different doctrine known as the “equal footing doctrine” that governed
states’ admission to the Union, “if not an outright invention”); id. at 2139-49 (arguing
that the “antinovelty” principle invoked by the Chief Justice in NFIB as a basis for
rejecting the government’s Commerce Clause argument was a similarly unprecedented
expansion of existing doctrine).
See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, Essay, The Problem with “Coercion Aversion”: Novel Questions and the
Avoidance Canon, 32 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1, 2 (2015) (“From the moment Justice
Kennedy floated [the coercion argument], . . . it was clear that coercion aversion could
point the way to five votes for the government.”); Michael Dorf, King v. Burwell PostMortem, Cont’d, DORF ON L. (Mar. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/3U9S-Y48Q (describing
the coercion-based avoidance argument as “very powerful”); Cristian Farias, Sotomayor
May Have Saved Obamacare, SLATE (Mar. 6, 2015, 12:04 PM), https://perma.cc/39UL
-9TXJ (predicting that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy would find the
coercion-based avoidance argument convincing).
King Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 16.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 48.
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As in Yates, Adoptive Couple, and Elonis, however, this interest at oral
argument did not translate into even brief mention of the avoidance canon in
the Court’s ultimate opinion. This was despite the fact that the Court again
rejected the most natural reading of the statute, instead construing the ACA to
permit tax credits for individuals who purchase insurance through exchanges
established by the federal government.196
Once again, the Court’s opinion relied heavily on the mischief rule to
achieve its statutory (re)construction. Notably, the opinion began by describing
the “long history of failed health insurance reform” in several states, tracing the
evolution of health insurance regulation since the 1990s and focusing on
Massachusetts’s ultimately successful system.197 In the Court’s telling, the
upshot of this history lesson was that Congress watched the 1990s reform
efforts play out and deliberately chose to copy Massachusetts’s successful
scheme. Thus, the ACA was modeled on three key Massachusetts reforms:
(1) mandatory coverage and a bar against price discrimination based on current
health, (2) an individual mandate, and (3) tax subsidies.198 By adopting this
“lessons learned from state experiences” narrative of the legislative process that
produced the ACA, the Court read into the Act’s legislative history an
overarching goal of avoiding insurance market failure.199 From there, it had
little trouble choosing the statutory construction that would “avoid the type of
calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid.”200 Indeed, the Court’s
opinion ended with a tellingly mischief-focused remark: “Congress passed the
Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy
them.”201
The path of avoidance resistance in King was different in several respects
from the other cases discussed in this Part. Most notably, the avoidance
argument in King was raised not by the parties, but by amicus briefs.202
Further, the coercion argument relied on a novel constitutional theory203
196. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495-96 (2015).
197. See id. at 2485-86.
198. See id. at 2486-87.
199. See id. at 2492-94 (relying on the “three major reforms” upon which Congress based the

200.
201.
202.

203.

ACA to buttress the conclusion that “the statutory scheme compels us to reject [the
challengers’] interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance
market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very ‘death spirals’
that Congress designed the Act to avoid”).
See id. at 2495-96.
Id. at 2496.
See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Professor Thomas W.
Merrill et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6-11, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(No. 14-114), 2015 WL 456257 (making a related argument based on the federalism clear
statement principle).
See Sohoni, supra note 190, at 2-3.
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rather than established rules about vagueness, federalism, or the First
Amendment. Despite these differences, however, the Court’s failure to mention
the avoidance canon once it had been raised seems a noteworthy departure
from its affinity for the canon in earlier Terms. Indeed, it is likely that amici—
sophisticated law professors and attorneys—raised (some might even say
concocted) the coercion argument precisely because of the Roberts Court’s
penchant in earlier Terms for employing avoidance to rewrite statutes. That
the Court did not take the avoidance bait in King—or in the other cases
described in this Part—suggests that the Court’s approach to the avoidance
canon has changed significantly.
* * *
Some may view the rule of lenity and the federalism clear statement
principle, employed by the Court in some of its later-Term cases, as alternate
versions of the avoidance canon—and therefore see the Court’s moves in these
cases as unexceptional, rather than illustrative of a marked change in
interpretive approach. On the one hand, this view is understandable; both the
rule of lenity and the federalism clear statement principle are based in
constitutional law, and both steer courts away from particular statutory
constructions in order to protect important constitutional principles.
But this does not, in my view, mean that the Roberts Court’s move to
employ these canons in lieu of avoidance was ordinary or unremarkable. As
noted above, the Roberts Court showed a noteworthy affinity for the
avoidance canon during its first several Terms—an affinity that was
pronounced enough for several commentators to take note.204 So the Court’s
shift toward abandoning avoidance and instead employing other canons—even
in cases where avoidance was teed up by the parties and discussed at oral
argument—seems like a meaningful shift in interpretive approach. One mark
of this shift is the difference in the approaches taken by the majority in Skilling
and the plurality in Yates. Both cases involved a vagueness challenge to a
criminal statute that prompted arguments based in lenity and avoidance.
Lenity and avoidance are not mutually exclusive canons; Skilling invoked both,
although it relied heavily on avoidance and mentioned lenity only in
passing.205 By contrast, the Yates plurality relied exclusively on lenity—failing
even to mention avoidance. Combined with the evidence of similar
conspicuous omissions of the avoidance canon in the other later-Term cases
discussed in this Part, this suggests a pattern.
Also noteworthy is that a focused search of briefs and oral argument
transcripts for all statutory cases decided between 2006 and 2012 identified
204. See supra Part I.B.
205. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405-06 (2010) (discussing avoidance); id. at

410-11 (discussing lenity).

552

Passive Avoidance
71 STAN. L. REV. 513 (2019)

only two early-Term cases in which the avoidance canon was raised both in
the parties’ briefs and at oral argument but not ultimately mentioned in the
Court’s opinion.206 By contrast, in the period between 2013 and 2017, there
were seven such cases.207 This phenomenon is consistent with this Article’s
206. My research assistants and I performed targeted word searches of the parties’ briefs

(not including amicus briefs) and oral argument transcripts for every statutory case
decided by the Roberts Court between 2006 and 2012. We found only two cases during
this period in which the avoidance canon was discussed in at least one of the parties’
briefs and also by the Justices at oral argument but was not mentioned in the Court’s
opinion. (We did not count cases in which a party’s lawyer raised avoidance during oral
argument but none of the Justices engaged with the argument.) The two cases were
United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009), and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308 (2007).
Denedo presented the question whether an Article I military appellate court has
jurisdiction over a writ of error coram nobis seeking to set aside, on ineffective
assistance of counsel grounds, a guilty plea previously entered in military court. See 556
U.S. at 906-08. Denedo’s brief argued, inter alia, that his coram nobis petition should be
allowed “to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a federal
statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.”
Brief for the Respondent at 38, Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (No. 08-267), 2009 WL 317463
(quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)). At oral argument, Denedo’s attorney,
aided by Justice Kennedy, suggested that the Court should construe the statute so as to
avoid confronting the unresolved question whether the Constitution requires that
individuals in Denedo’s position have some available avenue of relief. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 29-32, Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (No. 08-267), 2009 WL 772849. Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia expressed skepticism about the merits of this
argument, see id. at 31-32, which may explain why the Court’s opinion ultimately did
not reference the avoidance canon.
In Tellabs, the respondents’ brief argued that the pleading standard advocated by the
petitioners would violate the Seventh Amendment because it imposed a stricter
standard for pleading securities fraud claims than courts impose when deciding
posttrial and summary judgment motions, and thus interfered with the jury’s
factfinding role. See Brief for Respondents at 16, 39-45, Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308 (No. 06-484),
2007 WL 760412. At oral argument, Justices Scalia and Kennedy both inquired about
the Seventh Amendment issue and suggested that the pleading standard should be
construed consistently with the summary judgment and posttrial motion standard in
order to avoid the constitutional question. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4,
23-24, Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308 (No. 06-484), 2007 WL 967033. The Court ultimately adopted
a pleading standard that differed from that imposed for summary judgment and
posttrial motions, see Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314, 328-29, and—reaching the constitutional
question—explicitly held that this created no Seventh Amendment problem, see id. at
326-27.
As these two cases illustrate, there do not appear to be any cases decided in the period
between 2006 and 2012 in which the Court took the constitutional concerns raised by
the parties seriously and adopted a statutory reading that effectively avoided the
constitutional issue, but in which it failed to mention the avoidance canon in its
opinion.
207. See sources cited supra note 86.
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anecdotal observations that the Roberts Court seemed much more willing in
its early Terms than in more recent ones to invoke avoidance in its opinions
when the canon was raised in the briefs and at oral argument.
Perhaps more importantly, the rule of lenity and the federalism clear
statement principle differ in important ways from the avoidance canon.
Unlike avoidance, neither requires the court to find a constitutional infirmity
(or probable infirmity). When the Court invokes the rule of lenity, it is not
saying that the statute at issue otherwise would be void for vagueness; likewise,
when it invokes the federalism clear statement principle, it is not saying that
the statute otherwise would intrude unconstitutionally on states’ rights. The
rule of lenity dictates only that if a criminal statute is ambiguous, it should be
construed in the defendant’s favor in order to avoid the possibility (not the
probability or the certitude) that the defendant lacked notice that his conduct
violated the statute.208 Moreover, the rule of lenity is triggered only if the
statute is ambiguous; it does not allow the court to rewrite or carve out
exceptions from an otherwise clear statute.209 Similarly, the federalism clear
statement principle requires no serious constitutional analysis or conclusion
that the federal government lacks the power to intrude on state power in the
way required by the rejected statutory reading.210 On the contrary, the canon’s
entire point is that the federal government does have the power to intrude on
state authority (under, for example, the Supremacy Clause211)—but that
interpreters should be absolutely certain that the federal government intended
to so intrude before reading the statute that way.212 Moreover, the federalism
208. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (noting that under the rule

209.

210.

211.
212.

of lenity, “an ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of the accused”);
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971)) (similar); see also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994)
(“[W]here text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government’s position is
unambiguously correct—we apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the
defendant’s] favor.”).
See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342 (1981) (“[T]he ‘touchstone’ of the
rule of lenity ‘is statutory ambiguity.’” (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381,
387 (1980), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-690, tit. VI, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4312, 4377 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963
(2017)))); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (observing that the rule of
lenity “only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity”).
See, e.g., Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 677 (2011) (applying the federalism clear
statement principle without any constitutional analysis); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555
U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (similar).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 630-31 (1992); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1991) (acknowledging Congress’s power to
regulate state functions under the Commerce Clause, but noting that “we must be
footnote continued on next page
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clear statement principle is available anytime a federal statute regulates an area
ordinarily regulated by state law. It does not matter how extensive the federal
intrusion is; the mere presence of a federal-state overlap is enough to trigger a
presumption of nonintrusion.
In this sense, both the rule of lenity and the federalism clear statement
principle can be viewed as a form of “avoidance lite.” Each empowers the Court
to avoid deciding (or engaging seriously with) controversial constitutional
questions and to sidestep constitutionally problematic interpretations—and to
do so without openly rewriting the statute, or at least without admitting to
rewriting the statute. In so doing, these tools enable the Court to avoid
subjecting itself to criticism for (unnecessarily) resolving controversial
constitutional questions or circumventing a statute’s text.
These canons share another virtue as well: They are both more directly
linked to the constitutional problem at issue than is the avoidance canon. That
is, where the issue at stake involves criminal liability—and particularly where
vagueness is a concern—it makes more sense for the Court to invoke the rule of
lenity than to summon the imprecise and nebulous avoidance canon. Similarly,
where the balance of power between the federal and state governments is at
issue, the federalism clear statement principle is the more appropriate canon to
invoke.213
B. Diminished Avoidance
Another indicator of the Court’s recent hesitance to invoke the avoidance
canon is that only a handful of majority opinions issued since 2012—five,
including Bond—have cited the avoidance canon.214 Of these, only one has
absolutely certain that Congress intended [to] exercise” that power); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (acknowledging that “Congress may fix
the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States,” but holding that “if
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously”).
213. Many thanks to Kevin Stack for this point.
214. See infra Appendix. For a discussion of Bond, see Part II.A.3 above. For the other four
cases, see McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016); Mathis v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016); Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1725-26
(2014); and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013). During this same
period, nine concurring or dissenting opinions—six authored by Justice Thomas—also
invoked the avoidance canon. See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2290-92
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2082-85 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
135 S. Ct. 2652, 2688-89 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2551 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting);
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316-18 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2570-71 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2294-95 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment);
footnote continued on next page
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engaged in serious discussion of the constitutional infirmity presented by the
rejected statutory reading—and even that opinion did not rely on avoidance to
adopt an alternate reading of the statute.215 In order to provide a clearer picture
of how the Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance canon has shifted in recent
years, this Subpart provides a brief overview of the later-Term (post-2012)
Roberts Court cases that did invoke the avoidance canon.216
1.

Afterthought avoidance

The one later-Term majority opinion that invoked the avoidance canon
and contained significant discussion of the constitutional issues at stake is
McDonnell v. United States.217 McDonnell involved charges that Virginia
Governor Robert McDonnell committed honest services fraud, as defined
under the federal bribery statute.218 Specifically, McDonnell was accused of

215.

216.

217.
218.

Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2269-70 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2273 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also infra Appendix.
See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373; see also infra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
Three of the concurring or dissenting opinions that invoked the avoidance canon
during this period also engaged in significant discussion of the constitutional issue. See
Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2082-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at
2570-71 (Thomas, J., concurring); Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2269-70 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
This Subpart does not discuss, and the Appendix below does not list, cases in which the
Court mentioned, but declined to apply, the avoidance canon—which was often done
in order to reject an argument made in a lower court opinion or brief. There were a
handful of cases like this decided during the period between 2013 and 2017; in these
cases, the Court tended to find that the statute was unambiguous—so that the threshold
condition for invoking the avoidance canon was missing—and that the constitutional
question raised by the party had already been decided in an earlier case or was a
“cursory” argument not properly before the Court. See McFadden v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 2298, 2306-07 (2015) (“Even if this statute were ambiguous, [petitioner’s] argument
would falter. Under our precedents, a scienter requirement in a statute ‘alleviate[s]
vagueness concerns’ . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007))); Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) (rejecting the
argument that avoidance applied because of “the clarity of both the text and history” of
the federal rule of evidence in question, and because an earlier case had already resolved
the constitutional question); United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1416 (2014)
(“[T]he meaning of the statute is sufficiently clear that we need not indulge [petitioner’s] cursory nod to constitutional avoidance concerns.”); United States v. Apel, 134
S. Ct. 1144, 1153 (2014) (declining to reach constitutional arguments that the court of
appeals had not adjudicated and rejecting the attempt to “repackage” those arguments
into a constitutional avoidance claim).
136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
See id. at 2361-65. The federal bribery statute makes it a crime for “a public official or
person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly [to] demand[],
seek[], receive[], accept[], or agree[] to receive or accept anything of value . . . in return
for . . . being influenced in the performance of any official act.” 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A)
(2017). The term “official act” is defined by the statute as “any decision or action on any
footnote continued on next page
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accepting “payments, loans, gifts, and other things of value” from a Virginia
businessman and his company in exchange for arranging meetings and hosting
events that put the businessman in contact with researchers at Virginia public
universities—whom the businessman hoped to convince to conduct studies
that would help promote his products.219
The Court concluded that a plain reading of the statutory text precluded a
holding that the meetings, events, and other introductions made by the
Governor constituted a “decision or action” on a “question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy,” and that the Governor’s actions therefore fell
outside the ambit of the bribery statute.220 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court cited dictionary definitions, language canons such as noscitur a sociis, the
canon against superfluity, and its own precedents.221 It then noted, almost as an
afterthought, that “[i]n addition to being inconsistent with both text and
precedent, the Government’s expansive interpretation of ‘official act’ would
raise significant constitutional concerns”—and went on to describe the due
process, vagueness, and federalism problems with the government’s reading of
the statute.222
Despite the Court’s explicit discussion of the constitutional infirmities
avoided by its chosen construction, McDonnell differs from the avoidance cases
described in Part I above in three important ways. First, the Court’s interpretation did not strain the statute; indeed, it was consistent with the statute’s text and
at least arguably represented the statute’s most straightforward reading. Second,
the Court’s opinion did not place the constitutional concerns front and center,
but merely offered them as a secondary justification for the Court’s chosen
construction. Third, the Court did not even clearly invoke the avoidance canon
in its discussion—making only a vague observation that its interpretation “avoids
this ‘vagueness shoal’”223 rather than reciting a classic formulation of the canon,
such as that “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s
official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.” Id. § 201(a)(3).
See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2362-65.
See id. at 2368-72 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)).
See id.
See id. at 2372-73.
Id. at 2373 (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010)).
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statute from unconstitutionality”224 or that “th[e] Court will not pass on the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.”225
The other majority opinions issued during Terms between 2012 and 2016
that invoked avoidance similarly employed the canon only as a secondary
interpretive tool. In Paroline v. United States, for example, the Court turned to
avoidance only after discussing the statute’s text, its purpose, the common law,
precedent, grammar rules, and the whole act rule,226 pointing out in passing
that the reading it was rejecting “might raise questions under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment” and explaining the constitutional issue
in a brief aside.227 As in McDonnell, the Eighth Amendment issue did not feature
prominently in the Court’s opinion, and was offered merely as a secondary
justification for its ruling.228 Other recent Roberts Court opinions that have
invoked the avoidance canon likewise have made only minimal use of it,
engaging in little discussion of the constitutional issue and relying only
secondarily on the canon, or mentioning it only in passing.229
2.

Justice Thomas

While the Court as a whole seems to have ratcheted down its use of the
avoidance canon in recent Terms, Justice Thomas has been an outlier,

224. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895); see also, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.

225.

226.
227.
228.

229.

124, 153 (2007) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980); see also, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17,
26-27 (1968); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
See 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1718-22 (2014).
Id. at 1725-26; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed . . . .”).
The Court’s treatment of the avoidance canon and the constitutional issue in
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), was similar to its treatment of the canon
in McDonnell and Paroline. As in those cases, the Court in Descamps turned to avoidance
only after concluding that the statute’s text, its legislative history, and precedents
involving similar statutes all supported the Court’s chosen construction. See id. at
2283-89. More importantly, the Sixth Amendment concern was not the decisive factor
in the Court’s decision to construe the statute the way it did, but rather just one of
many interpretive considerations. See id.
See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2290-91 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2253 (2016); Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2074, 2082-85 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2551 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316-18 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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invoking the canon in six concurring or dissenting opinions since 2012.230 In
two of these opinions, he discussed the constitutional difficulty at issue
extensively, and advocated a strained, or at least less than plain, reading of the
statute in order to avoid that difficulty. One of these opinions was Adoptive
Couple, discussed above.231 Whereas the majority opinion in Adoptive Couple
ignored the federalism concerns created by the interplay between ICWA and
state custody laws, Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion that
discussed those concerns in detail and relied heavily on the avoidance canon to
justify construing ICWA not to apply to biological fathers who never had
custody of their children.232
The other case was Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.233 In Inter
Tribal Council, the Court held that the National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA), which requires states to “accept and use” a federal registration form,
preempts Arizona state laws that require voters to present additional
information when they register.234 Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the
NVRA should be construed to require only that Arizona “accept and use” the
federal form as part of its voter registration process, and to leave the state free
to request any additional information it determines necessary to ensure the
integrity of the voter registration process.235 He based this construction almost
entirely on the avoidance canon. At the outset of his opinion, Justice Thomas
observed that the interpretations advanced by the parties “are both plausible”
and then launched into a lengthy discussion about the meaning of the
Constitution’s Voter Qualification Clause.236 Ultimately, he concluded that the
Constitution gives states the exclusive authority to set voter qualifications and
to determine whether those qualifications are satisfied—and that in order to
avoid violating this Clause, the NVRA must be construed not to preempt
Arizona’s voter registration laws.237

230. See supra note 214.
231. See supra Part II.A.2.
232. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2566-71 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
233.
234.

235.
236.

237.

concurring).
133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
See id. at 2251, 2260; see also National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31,
107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. §§ 3627, 3629 (2017); and 52 U.S.C. §§ 2050120511 (2017)).
See Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2262 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2263-68; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall
be composed of Members chosen . . . by the People of the several States, and the Electors
in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature.”).
See Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2270 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas’s opinions in Adoptive Couple and Inter Tribal Council read
very much like the early Roberts Court opinions discussed in Part I above. Like
those early-Term opinions, these two Justice Thomas opinions placed the
constitutional issue front and center, discussed the issue at length, and relied on
it as the decisive factor in determining how to construe the statute. Moreover,
Justice Thomas’s Adoptive Couple concurrence rewrote, or at least strained, the
text of ICWA—effectively adding a qualification that parents must have had
custody of the child in order to come within the statute’s protections—in much
the same way that the opinions discussed in Part I above strained or rewrote
the text of the respective statutes.
Despite Justice Thomas’s prominent use of the avoidance canon in a
number of solo dissents and concurrences, however, the overall picture that
emerges from the Roberts Court is that it seems to have ratcheted down its use
of the avoidance canon over the last few Terms. That is, the Court appears to
have shifted from an aggressive approach, in which it openly employed the
canon to rewrite statutes, to one in which it is willing to rely on the canon only
secondarily—to buttress a construction reached through other interpretive
tools—and is unwilling to use the canon as a primary justification for its chosen
construction. This shift is especially noteworthy in Bond and Elonis, the two
later-Term cases discussed in Part II above that were authored by Chief Justice
Roberts,238 the architect of the Court’s aggressive use of avoidance in nearly all
of the early-Term cases.239
3.

Jennings v. Rodriguez

Although decided outside the period studied, one other case bears mention
for its prominent discussion of the avoidance canon—Jennings v. Rodriguez,
decided during the 2017 Term.240 Jennings involved three provisions of U.S.
immigration law that authorize the detention of aliens during the course of
their immigration proceedings.241 The Ninth Circuit, citing due process
concerns and relying heavily on the avoidance canon, had construed the
statutes to contain an implicit six-month limit on the length of time that an
alien may be detained without a bond hearing.242 A majority of the Supreme
Court rejected that avoidance-based reading, emphasizing that the avoidance
canon can only be invoked to support an otherwise plausible statutory
construction—and insisting that the lower court’s construction requiring a
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra Parts II.A.3-.4.
See supra Part I.A.
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
See id. at 838-39; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), (c) (2017).
See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1078-85 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Jennings,
138 S. Ct. 830.
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bond hearing every six months was not a plausible interpretation of the
relevant text.243 Rather than decide in the first instance whether the statutes,
absent the bond hearing requirement, violated the Due Process Clause, the
Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to decide that constitutional
question.244
Jennings is noteworthy for a few reasons. On the one hand, the Court
declined the opportunity to employ the avoidance canon, continuing its laterTerm pattern of resistance to invoking avoidance and openly rewriting
statutes. Further, although the Ninth Circuit’s heavy reliance on the avoidance
canon forced the majority to explicitly discuss the canon—rather than quietly
ignore it as it did in cases like Yates245—the Court used this opportunity to beef
up the threshold conditions required to invoke avoidance, limiting the canon’s
application not just in this case but in future cases as well. Specifically, the
Court insisted that “[s]potting a constitutional issue does not give a court
authority to rewrite a statute as it pleases,” and emphasized that the canon
permits courts only to “choos[e] between competing plausible interpretations of
a statutory text.”246 In so doing, the Court cast itself as a passive, rather than
active, judicial reviewer, one that is respectful of the legislature’s work and
unwilling to overstep its bounds. Moreover, in reframing the terms under
which the avoidance canon should be invoked, the Court further signaled its
own hesitance to use a canon it had freely embraced only a few years earlier.
On the other hand, however, the Court did not actually avoid the constitutional issue implicated in the case. Indeed, while the Court managed to avoid
confronting the due process issue for the moment by remanding the case to the
Ninth Circuit, that move merely punted the issue to another court; it did not
resolve the case on narrower grounds or eliminate the need for the judiciary to
grapple with the constitutional question raised. In fact, if the Ninth Circuit
rules on remand that the immigration statutes at issue violate due process, the
Court could be called on to review that decision and to squarely confront the
constitutional question. In this sense, Jennings differs from the passive
avoidance cases discussed in this Part, in which the Court bypassed entirely,
rather than merely punted, serious constitutional issues.
So what explains this apparent incongruence? Why was the Court willing
to adopt a potentially problematic statutory construction and send the case
243. See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 843.
244. See id. at 851-52. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the case to the district court for

consideration of the due process issue, among others. See Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d
252 (9th Cir. 2018).
245. See supra Part II.A.1.
246. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 843 (alteration in original) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.
371, 381 (2005)).
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back to the lower court for direct resolution of the constitutional question,
rather than find a clever, passive way to avoid engaging the constitutional
question as it did in the other cases discussed in this Part? Reading between the
lines, my view is that a majority of the Court in Jennings saw no serious
constitutional problem with the immigration statutes’ most straightforward
reading—that is, the reading that provides no right to a bond hearing for aliens
detained for more than six months pending resolution of their immigration
cases.
Comments made by some of the Justices at oral argument suggest as much.
Chief Justice Roberts, for example, noted that at least part of the reason for the
prolonged detention of the aliens composing the relevant class is that those
aliens were busy “compiling an evidentiary record to substantiate their claims”
and that this self-imposed delay should be “taken into account” in evaluating
the reasonableness, for due process purposes, of an alien’s detention.247 Justice
Alito similarly questioned the constitutional basis for finding that an alien
could not be detained for longer than six months without a bond hearing,
asking, “Where does it say six months in the Constitution? Why is it six? Why
isn’t it seven? Why isn’t it five? Why isn’t it eight?”248 Ultimately, then,
Jennings may simply be a case in which a majority of the Court saw little reason
to engage in creative avoidance of the constitutional question because it failed
to find the alleged constitutional difficulty particularly thorny, complicated, or
serious—and, therefore, considered the statute to be in little danger of
invalidation.249
III. Some Theories
In the years since 2012—when Chief Justice Roberts boldly embraced the
avoidance canon in NFIB—the Roberts Court’s approach to constitutional
avoidance seems to have shifted to either passive avoidance, or quiet mention—
afterthought avoidance—at most. Why? This Part explores one possible
explanation: The Court may be reacting to the critical commentary that
followed its use of the avoidance canon in Northwest Austin, NFIB, and, to a
lesser extent, Skilling. Out of concern for its legitimacy as an institution and a
247. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46-47, Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830 (No. 15-1204), 2017

WL 4882786.
248. Id. at 42.
249. In this sense, Jennings is similar to United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009), discussed

above, in which some Justices expressed skepticism at oral argument about the
seriousness of the constitutional issue raised in the parties’ briefs. See supra note 206.
There, too, the opinion issued by the Court declined the invitation to invoke the
avoidance canon. See supra note 206; cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S.
64, 86-87 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s application of the
avoidance canon in part because it “raise[d] baseless constitutional doubts”).
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desire to quiet accusations that it is an activist Court, it may be proceeding
cautiously, reluctant to rest another statutory construction squarely on the
back of the avoidance canon—and especially reluctant to raise critics’ ire by
once again citing the canon as justification for rewriting, or at least evading, a
statute’s most straightforward meaning. Relatedly, the Court may be
employing a “passive avoidance” approach, similar to the “passive virtues”
advocated by Alexander Bickel, in resolving cases that raise serious
constitutional questions. That is, the Court may be finding narrower decisional
grounds than the consequential avoidance canon, when possible, in order to
avoid deciding more than is necessary in a given case.
A. Avoidance Retreat
The avoidance canon is a potent tool of statutory construction. Almost
more legislative than judicial in nature, it empowers judges not merely to
identify a statute’s meaning, but to modify that meaning, if necessary, to save
the statute. Depending on one’s point of view, it also can be viewed as allowing
judges to choose among reasonably plausible meanings in a manner that
preserves congressional intent.250 Because the threshold determination of
constitutional necessity that justifies invoking the canon is left up to judges,
the canon empowers courts to improve or limit statutes, or to admonish
Congress about coming close to a constitutional line, without having to take
the drastic and activist step of invalidating an act of a coequal branch. In the
Roberts Court, this feature led to the active use of the avoidance canon
described in Part I.A above, as well as the critical commentary described in
Part I.B above.
Since then, the Roberts Court has gone from a period of aggressively and
openly using the avoidance canon to stake out strong constitutional stances to
a period of relative nonreliance on the avoidance canon. Indeed, in the last
several Terms (cases decided between late 2012 and mid-2017), the Court has
either completely ignored the avoidance canon despite its obvious relevance to
a case or has invoked it in a subdued manner. While it is unclear precisely what
kind of feedback loop exists between the Court and public commentary,251 and
although it is difficult to point to evidence that a particular negative comment
250. See, e.g., Gilbert Lee, Comment, How Many Avoidance Canons Are There After Clark v.

Martinez, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 193, 198-99 (2007) (“The avoidance canon allows courts
to refrain from striking down statutes full stop, functioning as ‘a means of giving effect
to congressional intent, not of subverting it.’” (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 382)); see also
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of constitutional doubt is meant to effectuate, not to subvert, congressional intent . . . .”).
251. But see Crawford, supra note 78 (reporting that Chief Justice Roberts “pays attention to
media coverage”).
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influenced the Court, it seems at least possible, if not likely, that the Court’s
recent avoidance retreat was motivated, in part, by the widespread criticism
that followed its use of the canon in earlier Terms.
This retreat in response to public criticism makes sense, moreover, because
the Roberts Court’s decisions to uphold statutes such as the VRA (in Northwest
Austin) and the ACA (in NFIB) appear to have stemmed from a desire to
preserve the Court’s legitimacy as an institution.252 That is, the Court, and
particularly Chief Justice Roberts, appeared to employ avoidance in the earlyTerm cases discussed in Part I above precisely in order to uphold Congress’s
work product and avoid being cast as an activist, political institution.253
Notably, Chief Justice Roberts himself has acknowledged in public
interviews that Chief Justices are likely to set aside their personal views for the
good of the Court and that it is a “high priority” of his “to keep any kind of
partisan divide out of the judiciary.”254 As commentators have noted, Chief
Justice Roberts was “almost certainly [] aware” of significant pressure from
political actors (including President Obama) and from “media outlets ‘warning
of damage to the [C]ourt—and to [Chief Justice] Roberts’ reputation—if the
Court were to strike down’” the ACA.255 By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts’s
252. This is the view that numerous commentators have taken. See, e.g., Hasen, supra

note 14, at 218 (speculating that the Court’s use of avoidance in Northwest Austin was
motivated by “fears that full-blown constitutional pronouncement would harm its
legitimacy”); A.E. Dick Howard, Essay, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA.
L. REV.: IN BRIEF 76, 89 (2012) (“[T]he decision in [NFIB] can be seen as a considered move
to protect the Court’s legitimacy and to enhance its capital in the country’s affairs.”);
Re, supra note 15, at 181 (“With the Court’s legitimacy at stake, the Chief Justice
strained to preserve the law, and did.”). Indeed, news reports speculated that Chief
Justice Roberts switched his vote in NFIB in order to win public support and enhance
the legitimacy of the Court. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 78.
253. See, e.g., John K. DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme Court’s Ruling
and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 135, 136 (2012) (applauding
Chief Justice Roberts’s NFIB opinion for navigating political currents “in a manner that
extricated the Court from a political firestorm that would have threatened the Court’s
legitimacy and institutional standing”); Jacobi, supra note 72, at 769 (arguing that Chief
Justice Roberts’s “driving concern [in NFIB] was credibility—the institutional
legitimacy of the Court, and his own reputation and legacy”); John Cassidy, John Roberts
and Mitt Romney: Two Peas in a Pod, NEW YORKER (June 29, 2012), https://perma.cc
/8A22-LS73 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts “preserved the Court’s good name”);
David L. Franklin, Why Did Roberts Do It?, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 3:51 PM),
https://perma.cc/A77G-Y6JE (suggesting that the Court’s “very legitimacy” was at
stake and that Chief Justice Roberts ruled the way he did to “save” the Court); Roger
Parloff, In Defense of John Roberts, FORTUNE (June 29, 2012), https://perma.cc/HXQ3
-STC3 (lauding Chief Justice Roberts for tending to “the Court’s dwindling store of
credibility and perceived legitimacy”).
254. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATLANTIC (Jan.-Feb. 2007), https://perma.cc/G588-MC9D.
255. See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 12 (2017) (quoting Crawford, supra note 78).
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vote to uphold the ACA was widely praised in the press as an act of
“statesmanship”256 and of “simple noble leadership”257 that “place[d] the
bipartisan legitimacy of the Court above his own ideological agenda”258 and
“preserve[d] the legitimacy and integrity of the Supreme Court as being above
politics.”259
Thus, when academics later turned around and labeled the Roberts Court
activist for its aggressive use of the avoidance canon in NFIB and Northwest
Austin, and accused it of rewriting statutes to achieve instrumentalist goals in
these cases,260 it makes sense that the Court—and particularly its legitimacysensitive Chief Justice—would change gears and look for a different hook on
which to hang subsequent decisions. In particular, it makes sense that the post2012 Court has avoided openly acknowledging when it is, in effect, rewriting a
statute—and that it has been loath even to mention the avoidance canon in
such cases. Indeed, the Court may now view it as safer to reference the
avoidance canon only in passing, or as a secondary interpretive tool that
corroborates an interpretation reached primarily through other tools of
statutory construction.
Notably, this kind of avoidance retreat in response to critical commentary
has occurred before. As scholars have noted, during the McCarthy era, the
early Warren Court first ratcheted up its use of the avoidance canon for
several years, then ratcheted down that use following widespread criticism of
its earlier decisions.261 Specifically, from 1953 to 1957, the Warren Court
employed the avoidance canon in a series of cases involving the rights of
persons accused of subversive activities.262 In these cases, the Court typically
256. Adam Liptak, Roberts Shows Deft Hand as Swing Vote on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,

2012), https://perma.cc/3KCK-5ETN.
257. Thomas L. Friedman, Taking One for the Country, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012),

https://perma.cc/9V8H-6TDK.
258. Jeffrey Rosen, Welcome to the Roberts Court: How the Chief Justice Used Obamacare to Reveal

259.
260.

261.
262.

His True Identity, NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2012), https://perma.cc/EJ4F-P67V; see also
Jeffrey Rosen, Big Chief, NEW REPUBLIC (July 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/NY9A-NJG2
(“[Chief Justice] Roberts set aside his ideological preference to protect the Court from a
decision along party lines that would have imperiled its legitimacy.”).
Friedman, supra note 257.
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 14, at 219-20, 223; Jacobi, supra note 72, at 842-43; Katyal &
Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2110-12; Re, supra note 15, at 174-77, 185; Shapiro, supra
note 74, at 10-11.
See generally Frickey, supra note 22.
See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 300-02, 319 (1957) (“[O]ur first duty is to
construe this statute. In doing so we should not assume that Congress chose to
disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked . . . .”), overruled in part by
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215-16
(1957) (using the avoidance canon to skirt numerous potential constitutional violations); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 194-95, 198, 201-02 (1957) (avoiding
footnote continued on next page
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read the relevant statute narrowly to avoid the serious constitutional problems
created by the government’s investigations into, or sanctions against, persons
suspected of disloyalty or Communist Party membership.263
Several different concerns appear to have motivated the Warren Court’s
ratcheting up of the use of constitutional avoidance during the period between
1953 and 1957. Some of these concerns were similar to the concerns that
motivated the Roberts Court to ratchet up its use of the avoidance canon
decades later, while others were different.264 The most notable similarity was
that the Warren Court, like the Roberts Court, was concerned with preserving
its institutional legitimacy, and sought to avoid getting into a battle with
Congress or being viewed as usurping Congress’s power to investigate.265
Also like the Roberts Court, the Warren Court was widely criticized for its
aggressive use of the avoidance canon to rewrite statutes. The criticism came
from numerous quarters—the American Bar Association, several major
newspapers, and especially from Congress, which threatened but never enacted
several jurisdiction-stripping laws.266 As scholars have observed, these
criticisms seemed to cow some of the Court’s centrist Justices, who began to
back away from aggressive use of the avoidance canon and even to trim back
several avoidance-based precedents.267 After 1957, the Warren Court’s use of

263.
264.

265.

266.

267.

deciding “issues touching liberties that the Constitution safeguards”); Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 116-17, 122 (1956) (noting that
the case “plainly raises constitutional questions” but “must be decided on a nonconstitutional issue, if the record calls for it, without reaching constitutional problems”); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 498, 509-10 (1956) (declining to decide
whether “double or multiple punishment for the same overt acts directed against the
United States” is unconstitutional); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 334-35, 338 (1955)
(holding that an agency action was in violation of an executive order so that “the
constitutionality of the Order itself does not come into issue”); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953) (settling on an interpretation of a congressional resolution with
“special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive
in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional
questions avoided by another”).
See, e.g., Yates, 354 U.S. at 307-12; Witkovich, 353 U.S. at 199-202; Peters, 349 U.S. at 339-48;
Rumely, 345 U.S. at 47.
For example, the Warren Court, unlike the Roberts Court, sought to slow what it
perceived as an ongoing assault against the constitutional rights of citizens who were
being hauled before congressional committees and agency review boards. See Frickey,
supra note 22, at 455-57.
See id. at 416 (arguing that in one such congressional investigation case, the Court “was
using a picky legal technicality to avoid a constitutional confrontation with Congress”).
See id. at 426-32; see also WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 109-20 (1962); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 85-103 (2000).
See Frickey, supra note 22, at 432-37 (describing how the Court “trimmed back some of
its most controversial [avoidance] precedents” following widespread criticism); see also,
footnote continued on next page
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the avoidance canon fell off considerably.268 Indeed, the Court’s occasional
post-1957 avoidance cases have been described as “footnotes” to its aggressive
use of avoidance in the earlier subversive activities cases269—a description that
also would fit the Roberts Court’s post-2012 avoidance cases. Thus, once
congressional and public criticism undermined the Warren Court’s underlying
reasons for invoking the avoidance canon in the first place—that is,
preservation of the Court’s legitimacy—the Warren Court, like the Roberts
Court, ratcheted down its use of the canon and entered a period of retreat
during which it invoked the canon only minimally.
One important difference, however, between the Warren Court’s and the
Roberts Court’s avoidance retreats is that during the Warren Court’s
ratcheting-down period, it issued several new opinions that trimmed back
some of its most controversial avoidance precedents.270 Further, by the mid1960s, the Warren Court had experienced a change in personnel and thereafter
simply struck down McCarthy-era statutes that sought to limit individuals’
constitutional rights.271 By contrast, the Roberts Court’s ratcheting-down

268.

269.
270.

271.

e.g., MURPHY, supra note 266, at 239-41. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren supposedly
remarked of his colleague Justice Frankfurter that “Felix changed on Communist cases
because he couldn’t take criticism.” Roger K. Newman, The Warren Court and American
Politics: An Impressionistic Appreciation, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 661, 677 (2001) (reviewing
POWE, supra note 266) (quoting the papers of Drew Pearson); see also POWE, supra
note 266, at 141-42 (discussing the shift in Justice Frankfurter’s jurisprudence).
See Frickey, supra note 22, at 430 (explaining that by the 1957 Term, the Court’s use of
the avoidance canon to guard against congressional abuse of political dissidents “was
starting to flag”).
See id. at 437-39.
See, e.g., Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 888-90,
894-99 (1961) (narrowing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959)); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 116-17, 133 (1959) (narrowing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957)); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1959) (distinguishing Sweezy v. New
Hampshire ex rel. Wyman, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), and Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956)). But see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 223-30 (1961) (using avoidance
aggressively to save a statute).
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (invalidating
a state syndicalism statute); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 259-61 (1967) (invalidating the prohibition against employment of Communist Party members in any
defense facility); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 55-56, 61-62 (1967) (invalidating a
state’s loyalty oath requirement); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382
U.S. 70, 71-73, 77-78, 81 (1965) (invalidating a requirement that Communist Party
members must register); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 302-03, 305 (1965)
(invalidating a statute requiring detention of Communist propaganda); Aptheker v.
Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 501-02, 505 (1964) (invalidating a prohibition against
providing passports to Communists); see also Frickey, supra note 22, at 437-39. But cf.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 3 (1965) (upholding the denial of passport validation for
travel to Cuba).
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period has been marked by continued avoidance of constitutional questions—
across several cases in which it did not invalidate the statute or even mention
the avoidance canon.272 Rather than reverse course entirely, it has engaged in
“stealth” or “passive” avoidance.
B. Bickelian Passive Virtues
Alexander Bickel introduced the concept of the “passive virtues” of judicial
decisionmaking in a Harvard Law Review foreword summarizing the 1960
Supreme Court Term273 and in his book The Least Dangerous Branch.274 As
noted above, Bickel coined the term “passive virtues” to describe a court’s
prudent refusal to decide cases on substantive grounds if narrower grounds
exist on which the case can be resolved.275 Bickel argued that the passive
virtues are necessary because of something he termed “the countermajoritarian difficulty”—that is, the fact that unelected judges can and do
invalidate laws enacted by the people’s democratically accountable
representatives.276 He identified several doctrines that could be used in service
of the passive virtues, including ripeness, standing, the political question
doctrine, and dismissals of appeals for lack of a substantial federal question.277
He called these doctrines “techniques of ‘not doing,’ or devices for disposing of a
case while avoiding judgment on the constitutional issue it raises.”278 Bickel
argued that the Court uses these tools to avoid deciding big, consequential
questions when narrower grounds will suffice, and he encouraged it to keep
doing so—in part to protect the Court’s legitimacy and its ability to adjudicate
important constitutional questions when necessary.279
A second way to view the Roberts Court’s later-Term approach to the
avoidance canon is as a version of Bickel’s passive virtues. In other words, in
ratcheting down its use of the avoidance canon in response to critical
commentary, the Court may be borrowing a page from Bickel and employing a
272. See supra Part II.A.
273. See Bickel, supra note 21.

See BICKEL, supra note 23, at 111-98.
See generally id.; Bickel, supra note 21.
See BICKEL, supra note 23, at 16-23 (capitalization altered).
See Bickel, supra note 21, at 42-47. The idea of dismissing appeals for want of a federal
question is anachronistic given the lack of any substantial appellate jurisdiction in the
modern Supreme Court.
278. BICKEL, supra note 23, at 169.
279. See id. at 116 (arguing that the standing requirement in particular “creates a time lag
between legislation and adjudication” that “cushions the clash between the Court and
any given legislative majority and strengthens the Court’s hand in gaining acceptance
for its principles”); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:
An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1681-82 (2004).
274.
275.
276.
277.
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form of the passive virtues—what we might call “passive avoidance”—that
allows it to avoid difficult constitutional questions through the use of
narrower interpretive tools.
The next two Subparts closely examine three techniques of “passive
avoidance” that the Roberts Court has employed to help it evade some of the
problems generated by reliance on the avoidance canon. Part III.B.1 theorizes
about the Court’s use of the rule of lenity and the federalism clear statement
principle, two canons based in constitutional law that can be considered part of
an “avoidance penumbra” because they enable the Court to avoid deciding
constitutional questions on the merits while also side-stepping some of the
criticisms that have been levied against use of the avoidance canon—including
that it creates advisory opinions or amounts to a judicial power grab.
Part III.B.2 similarly analyzes the Roberts Court’s use of the “mischief” rule in a
number of its later-Term cases, suggesting that it too is a tool of “passive
avoidance.” As explained below, the mischief rule enables the Court to adopt a
statutory construction that conflicts with the statute’s apparent plain
meaning—while still claiming fidelity to Congress’s intent and avoiding
complicated constitutional questions.280
1.

Avoidance penumbras: lenity and federalism

As noted, Bickel’s article and book extolling the “passive virtues” identified
several techniques and doctrines that the Court uses to avoid deciding
constitutional issues, or at least to decide cases on narrower grounds. This
Subpart suggests that the Roberts Court similarly has employed a number of
techniques of “passive avoidance” that go one step further, enabling it to avoid
deciding thorny constitutional questions without invoking the avoidance
canon and without providing what are essentially advisory opinions on
unresolved constitutional questions.281
280. See infra Part III.B.2.
281. It is important to note that this form of constitutional avoidance differs from the

manner in which Bickel himself advocated that the Court employ the avoidance canon.
Bickel envisioned the Court using avoidance to sidestep constitutional issues, sending
them back to Congress to decide in the first instance—but doing so while admonishing
Congress about the serious constitutional values at stake. See BICKEL, supra note 23, at
156-61; see also Robert Weisberg, Essay, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the
New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 243 (1983) (explaining that Bickel urged courts
“to finesse [certain constitutional] issues through devices that would effectively
‘remand’ the statute to the legislature”). The Roberts Court’s later-Term cases have
gone one step further than this, for in declining to engage the constitutional issue—or
even mention the avoidance canon—they give no admonishment to Congress to
reconsider the issue.
Bickel also argued that the passive virtues contributed to the Court’s legitimacy by
avoiding the appearance of internal conflict within the Court itself. See BICKEL, supra
footnote continued on next page
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The rule of lenity and the federalism clear statement principle, for
example, can be viewed as part of an “avoidance penumbra”282 of sorts. I use the
term “penumbra” because these two canons operate like the avoidance canon in
that they steer courts away from statutory constructions that implicate
constitutional concerns—such as due process, vagueness, and federalism
violations—but do so in a manner that allows the Court to avoid engaging the
constitutional question in depth. For example, unlike the avoidance canon,
which requires that the rejected reading of a statute pose “serious constitutional
problems,”283 the rule of lenity requires only that the statute be ambiguous
regarding its coverage of the defendant’s behavior.284 Similarly, the federalism
clear statement principle requires only the absence of clear language
demonstrating that Congress intended for the statute to cover the situation at
issue despite the intrusion on an area normally regulated by the states.285

282.

283.

284.
285.

note 23, at 112 (“Occasions for differences in result would be infinitely fewer if certain
techniques of the mediating way . . . were more imaginatively utilized.”); Bickel, supra
note 21, at 41 (arguing that there would be “fewer occasions” for the Justices to disagree
if the passive virtue techniques were utilized more often). That benefit of the passive
virtues is not, however, similarly achieved in the passive avoidance cases. Indeed, in
many of the cases discussed in Part II above, concurring or dissenting opinions
discussed the contentious constitutional questions at some length, openly disagreeing
with the majority opinion.
But despite their failure to mask internal judicial disagreement, the tools of passive
avoidance employed by the Roberts Court in recent years offer many of the benefits
that Bickel touted—they enable the Court to refrain from stepping on the toes of the
democratically elected branches and to avoid issuing advisory opinions on constitutional questions the Court is not deciding. See BICKEL, supra note 23, at 114-15 (describing the Court’s obligation to avoid providing advisory opinions); id. at 206 (observing
that a benefit of the passive virtues is that they “work relatively no binding interference with the democratic process”); see also Bickel, supra note 21, at 42 (suggesting that
the standing doctrine ensures that advisory opinions are avoided). They have also
shielded the Court from the kind of negative commentary that followed its open,
aggressive use of the avoidance canon in cases such as Northwest Austin, Skilling, and
NFIB. See supra Part I.
Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance.”).
See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see also, e.g., United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. of the U.S. v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 71, 87 (“[T]he Court will supplant the otherwise-best result o[n]ly when it
believes that there is a serious or substantial constitutional question involved.”).
See supra text accompanying note 209.
See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“[I]f Congress intends
to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.’” (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985), superseded
in other part by statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506,
§ 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2017)))).
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In other words, lenity and the federalism clear statement principle operate
as default presumptions that place the burden on the proponent of a
constitutionally troublesome interpretation to demonstrate that the statute
clearly covers the conduct at issue (in the case of lenity), or clearly evinces a
congressional intent to tread on state authority (in the case of the federalism
clear statement principle). The avoidance canon, on the other hand, operates as
a trump card that empowers the Court to avoid following the statute’s clear
meaning—that is, to openly rewrite or strain the statute’s meaning—in order to
evade a potential constitutional violation. Both of these tools, and especially
the federalism clear statement principle, certainly can be used to rewrite or
strain the statute’s meaning, but they enable the Court to do so without openly
admitting that it is engaging in such rewriting or straining; instead, the Court
can simply insist that the text was not clear enough to unmistakably apply to
the conduct or tread on the state authority at issue.
Further, neither the rule of lenity nor the federalism clear statement
principle requires the Court to resolve (or nearly resolve) the constitutional
question at issue, as the avoidance canon does. When invoking lenity or the
federalism clear statement principle, the Court need not decide that the statute,
if read broadly, would (or probably would) violate due process or intrude on
state sovereignty to a degree that is impermissible. Indeed, the presumption
underlying the federalism clear statement principle is that federal laws may
intrude on state powers, so long as Congress makes its intent to do so
exceptionally clear in the statute’s text.286 Clarity, rather than substantive
constitutional validity, is the touchstone of the principle. Similarly, the Court
need not decide that a criminal statute is impermissibly vague in order to
invoke the rule of lenity. It need only decide that the statute is unclear about
whether the defendant’s behavior is covered; that is enough for lenity to kick
in and tip the scales in favor of the defendant.287 Both canons thus operate as
tiebreakers that apply whenever there is ambiguity about the scope of the
statute—although the federalism clear statement principle is more potent than
the rule of lenity because it applies unless the statute is exceptionally clear about
Congress’s intent to reverse the federalism norm by intruding on areas usually
regulated by the states.
By contrast, when the Court invokes avoidance, it must come very close to
resolving the constitutional question raised by the interpretation it is
rejecting—essentially providing an advisory opinion concluding that the
rejected interpretation would, or probably would, violate the Constitution.
286. See sources cited supra note 212.
287. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (noting that under the rule

of lenity, “an ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of the accused”);
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (similar); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (similar).
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Even under the modern form of avoidance sometimes employed by the Court,
the Court must at least conclude that there is a strong possibility that the
rejected reading would violate the Constitution.288 In contrast to the rule of
lenity and the federalism clear statement principle, avoidance requires much
more than a finding that the statute is ambiguous—it requires significant
constitutional analysis.289 Thus, by invoking lenity or the federalism clear
statement principle instead of the avoidance canon, the Court can decide less,
or rest its decision on narrower grounds, than it can when it invokes the
avoidance canon.
Consider, for example, the Court’s approach to the potential federalism
problem in Bond.290 A majority of the Court seemed to take the federalism issue
presented by the case seriously. Several of the Justices discussed federalism
concerns at oral argument.291 And the opinion issued by the Court spent a full
paragraph explaining that the federal government possesses only “limited
powers” and that the states retain the rest—including the police power and the
power to define local crimes.292 But there were countervailing constitutional
arguments supporting the government’s reading of the statute as well—that the
Constitution “deliberate[ly] . . . avoid[s] placing subject matter limitations on
the National Government’s power to make treaties,” and that the Court “ha[d]
never held that a statute implementing a valid treaty exceeds Congress’s
enumerated powers.”293 Rather than resolve this difficult constitutional
question, the Court nodded toward the avoidance canon294 and then fell back
on the federalism clear statement principle to extricate itself from the potential
constitutional quagmire: “We conclude that, in this curious case, we can insist
on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, before
interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes on the
police power of the States.”295
288. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
289. See Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity, Ambiguity and Corpus

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

295.

Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 104 (2016) (“Applying lenity . . . requires a low
threshold of ambiguity.”); Phillip J. Riblett, Note, Avoiding the Avoidance Canon:
Subconstitutional Facial Challenge in Clark v. Martinez, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 409, 421-22
(2005) (noting that application of the avoidance canon comes “close to a straightforward constitutional analysis”).
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); see supra Part II.A.3.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086.
See id. at 2087.
See id. (“Notwithstanding this debate, it is ‘a well-established principle governing the
prudent exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the
case.’” (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam))).
Id. at 2090 (emphasis added).
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Despite the fact that the Bond majority opinion mentioned the avoidance
canon and openly discussed the constitutional treaty power issue, the Court’s
decision was different in at least two important ways from its early-Term
decisions in Northwest Austin, Skilling, and NFIB. First, by relying on the
federalism clear statement principle rather than the avoidance canon, the
Court avoided opining on whether a federal treaty-implementing statute
exceeds the scope of Congress’s powers if it covers local, intrastate crimes.
Instead, the Court was able to merely note that regulation of criminal conduct
that occurs within a state’s borders is usually governed by state law, and that if
the treaty-implementing statute covered such conduct, it would intrude on an
area normally regulated by the states. From there, it was able to invoke the
clear statement principle and insist on clarity from Congress before it would
construe the statute to cover Bond’s conduct, without deciding whether such
intrusion is permissible in order to effectuate a treaty.
Second, because the Court stopped at this threshold point—stating that
since Congress did not make clear that it intended X reading of the statute, and
X reading runs into federalism issues, the Court would adopt Y reading
instead—the Bond majority opinion did not have to openly admit to rewriting
the statute or to adopting a reading that was not straightforward or natural.
Indeed, quite the opposite—the Bond majority claimed that the reading it
adopted was most consistent with the statute’s text.296 These are both passive
virtues—avoiding saying more about the constitutional issue than is necessary,
and avoiding the appearance of a judicial power grab that can accompany
interpretations that openly circumvent a statute’s text.
2.

The “mischief” rule

A third tool of passive avoidance that the Court has employed in its laterTerm cases is the “mischief”297 rule. It makes theoretical sense that the Court
would turn to this rule to fill the role previously played by the avoidance
canon, for at least two reasons. First, talking about the mischief the statute was
designed to address enables the Court to tie its statutory readings closely to the
expectations that legislators had when they enacted the statute.298 This is a
powerful way to combat charges of judicial activism and to preserve the
Court’s institutional legitimacy—whether in response to accusations that it is
296. See id. (“[A]s a matter of natural meaning, an educated user of English would not

describe Bond’s crime as involving a ‘chemical weapon.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1))).
297. See supra note 106.
298. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical

Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990) (identifying the countermajoritarian
difficulty and positing that “[a]ny result not related to majoritarian expectations may
seem illegitimate in a democracy”).
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overstepping its judicial role and effectively legislating, or as a general means
of ameliorating the countermajoritarian difficulty.299 Second, the Roberts
Court, and Chief Justice Roberts in particular, has shown a tendency to pay
attention to the events that motivated a statute’s enactment, even in the earlyTerm cases in which it invoked the avoidance canon. In Skilling, for example,
the Court interpreted the mail fraud statute to cover certain conduct precisely
because the statute was enacted to override a previous judicial decision dealing
with that conduct.300 Thus, in the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence, avoidance
and statutory design long have gone hand in hand.
That said, the Roberts Court’s use of the mischief rule rule in recent years
differs in certain important respects from how the Supreme Court has
traditionally employed the rule.301 Indeed, one might describe the Roberts
Court’s recent approach as a repurposed, or textualized, use of the mischief
rule. Like the classic mischief rule, the Roberts Court’s version establishes a
core problem that the statute was designed to cover and insists that the statute
does not apply beyond that core. But unlike the traditional mischief rule, the
Roberts Court’s version grounds the statute’s core meaning not just in the
history that motivated its enactment, but also in linguistic aids such as
dictionary definitions, the whole act rule, and language canons like noscitur a
sociis—that is, in textualist interpretive tools. In Yates, for example, the
plurality interpreted the statute’s core meaning to encompass document
destruction based largely on the evidence tampering statute’s origins in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was enacted in response to the document
destruction and financial fraud that occurred during the Enron scandal.302 But
the Court backed up that core meaning by invoking the noscitur a sociis
canon,303 arguing that the list terms preceding “tangible object” in the statute—
including “record” and “document”—all refer to items used to record or

299. See supra text accompanying note 276.
300. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 399-402 (2010); supra notes 50-52 and

accompanying text; see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 868-70 (2017).
301. The mischief rule traditionally has relied on legislative history to establish the evil that
the statute was designed to address. For the classic example, see Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1892) (relying on testimony presented
before congressional committees to determine the “evil which [the statute] was
designed to remedy”). See also United States v. Carbone, 327 U.S. 633, 638-39 (1946)
(relying on legislative history to establish the “evil at which the Act was directed”).
302. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (plurality opinion); supra
notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
303. Noscitur a sociis translates from Latin as “it is known by its associates” and directs courts
to give an individual word in a list a meaning consistent with the words that surround
it. See Noscitur a Sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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preserve information,304 and with dictionary definitions showing that the
terms “mak[e] a false entry in” and “falsif[y]” normally “take as grammatical
objects records, documents, or things used to record or preserve information.”305 This is a textualist twist on the traditional mischief rule.
Likewise, in Bond, the Court interpreted the core meaning of the Chemical
Weapons Convention’s implementing statute as limited to the use of chemicals
in warfare or acts of terrorism, relying primarily on the fact that the
Convention was prompted by concerns about war crimes and terrorism.306 As
in Yates, however, the Court shored up this mischief argument with dictionary
definitions and an appeal to ordinary meaning—arguing that “the use of
something as a ‘weapon’ typically connotes ‘[a]n instrument of offensive or
defensive combat’” and that “as a matter of natural meaning, an educated user of
English would not describe Bond’s crime as involving a ‘chemical weapon.’”307
Similarly, in Adoptive Couple, the Court argued that the core problem
ICWA sought to address was the destruction of intact Indian families by child
welfare agencies—and that such destruction could not occur in situations
where the child’s biological father never had custody of the child prior to the
initiation of the adoption proceedings.308 The Court reinforced this argument
with numerous dictionary definitions, noting that the statutory term
304. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085 (plurality opinion) (“‘Tangible object’ is the last in a list of

terms that begins ‘any record [or] document.’ The term is therefore appropriately read
to refer, not to any tangible object, but specifically to the subset of tangible objects
involving records and documents, i.e., objects used to record or preserve information.”
(alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519)).
The statute at issue in Yates reads:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false
entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or
influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States . . . , or in relation to or contemplation of any
such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

305.
306.

307.

308.

18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2017).
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1086 (plurality opinion) (alterations in original).
See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014) (“[T]he chemicals in this case are
not of the sort that an ordinary person would associate with instruments of chemical
warfare. The substances that Bond used bear little resemblance to the deadly toxins that
are ‘of particular danger to the objectives of the Convention.’” (quoting Ian R. Kenyon,
Why We Need a Chemical Weapons Convention and an OPCW?, in THE CREATION OF THE
ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: A CASE STUDY IN THE
BIRTH OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION 1, 17 (Ian R. Kenyon & Daniel Feakes
eds., 2007))); supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090 (alteration in original) (first quoting Weapon, WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2002); and then quoting
18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1)).
See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561-62 (2013); supra text
accompanying notes 131-35.

575

Passive Avoidance
71 STAN. L. REV. 513 (2019)

“‘continued’ means ‘[c]arried on or kept up without cessation’ or ‘[e]xtended in
space without interruption or breach of conne[ct]ion.’”309 The Court also
employed dictionary definitions to support its construction that the statutory
term “breakup” requires “[t]he discontinuance of a relationship” or “an ending
as an effective entity,”310 arguing that “when an Indian parent abandons an
Indian child prior to birth and that child has never been in the Indian parent’s
legal or physical custody, there is no ‘relationship’ that would be ‘discontinu[ed]’—and no ‘effective entity’ that would be ‘end[ed]’—by the termination
of the Indian parent’s rights.”311
In each of these cases, the Court’s textualized mischief rule approach
enabled it to decide the case on narrower grounds than it could have if it had
used the avoidance canon, because the rule helped demonstrate that the Court’s
chosen construction was plausible, if not textually required. This is quite a
contrast from the approach taken in Northwest Austin, Skilling, and NFIB, where
each opinion invoking avoidance openly acknowledged that the construction
it adopted was not the straightforward, natural reading of the statute.312
The Court’s embrace of the mischief rule in recent cases may be, at least in
part, a strategic move designed to counter critics’ charges of judicial activism
following the aggressive use of avoidance in its early-Term cases. In other
words, the Roberts Court may be employing a textualized mischief rule both in
order to avoid invoking the disfavored avoidance canon, and to demonstrate
that the Court’s statutory readings are consistent with the statutes’ text and
design—not judicial usurpations of the legislature’s power.
A critic might counter that the alternate, constitutionally acceptable
interpretations adopted in the later-Term cases simply were more textually
plausible than those at issue in the early-Term cases, and that this fact accounts
for the Court’s emphasis on textualist canons and arguments in the later-Term
309. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 (alterations in original) (quoting Continued,

1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (21st prtg. 1981)).
310. Id. at 2562 (alteration in original) (first quoting Breakup, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1992); and then quoting Breakup,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra
note 307)).
311. Id. (alterations in original).
312. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 562-63 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (“The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands
individuals to purchase insurance.”); Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-13
(2010) (acknowledging that the defendant’s vagueness challenge “has force” and paring
the statute to its core to avoid vagueness problems); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 206-11 (2009) (acknowledging that the language of the
bailout provision suggests that the utility district was not a political subdivision, but
nevertheless concluding that constitutional concerns and statutory structure support a
different construction).
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cases. Indeed, the alternate interpretations adopted by the Court in Northwest
Austin and Skilling continue to look highly implausible no matter how hard
one squints at them. But the same can be said for the statutory interpretations
adopted by the Court in Yates, Bond, and King. The Court had to strain the
statutory text in these later-Term cases much as it did in its early-Term cases—
to argue that a fish is not a “tangible object,”313 that the use of toxic household
chemicals to injure a romantic rival does not count as the use of a “chemical
weapon,”314 and that an “Exchange established by the State” includes exchanges
established by the federal government.315
C. Benefits of Passive Avoidance
If the Court has been engaging in a form of passive avoidance in its recent
Terms, the question arises: Is this, on balance, a good or a bad thing? This
Subpart suggests that passive avoidance—avoiding constitutional questions
without invoking the avoidance canon—may be a positive development in the
Court’s statutory jurisprudence.
Let us first consider the ways in which “passive” avoidance differs from
“traditional” avoidance.316 Traditional avoidance typically begins with an
explanation that X interpretation of a statute would raise serious constitutional
doubts or would likely violate the Constitution. It thus requires at least some
discussion and analysis of the constitutional doctrine at issue. Indeed, in several
of the Roberts Court’s early-Term cases, ordinary avoidance involved serious, indepth discussion of the relevant constitutional doctrine.317 This discussion is
typically followed by a liberating invocation of some version of the avoidance
canon, such as: “[W]hen statutory language is susceptible of multiple
interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation that raises serious
constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an alternative that avoids those
problems.”318 Traditional avoidance empowers the Court to then choose
See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1079 (2015) (plurality opinion).
See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014).
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488, 2492-96 (2015).
By “traditional,” I mean both the “classic” and “modern” forms of avoidance employed
by the Court over the years. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
317. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 548-61 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 202-04;
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21-25 (2009) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Office of Senator
Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S. 511, 513-15 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
150-54 (2007); cf. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408 (acknowledging without lengthy discussion
that construing the statute “to proscribe a wider range of offensive conduct” would
pose vagueness problems).
318. E.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018); see also, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543
U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (explaining that avoidance is “a tool for choosing between
competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable
presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious
footnote continued on next page
313.
314.
315.
316.
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Y interpretation of the statute, even while acknowledging that X interpretation
constitutes the most “straightforward” or “natural” reading of the statute.319
Passive avoidance operates somewhat differently. It need not involve any
constitutional analysis or discussion at all. Indeed, the Court can simply invoke
the mischief that the statute was designed to remedy and rely on that mischief
to define the outer limits of the statute’s reach in a way that excludes the
conduct that, if covered, would make the statute constitutionally problematic.
In this way, the Court can avoid the potential constitutional difficulty without
analyzing or even mentioning the constitutional issues at stake. This is
essentially what the Court did in Adoptive Couple.320 Alternately, as in Elonis, the
Court may simply read a requirement or limitation into the statute that has the
effect of avoiding the constitutional issue, without reference to the mischief
rule or to the constitutional difficulty.321
Even where passive avoidance does involve recognition of the constitutional issues, this can be accomplished in a manner that differs noticeably from
traditional avoidance. Where, for example, the Court employs the rule of
lenity in lieu of traditional avoidance, it can simply state that the statute is
ambiguous regarding its coverage of the defendant’s conduct and proceed to
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. No vagueness analysis is
required. Similarly, where the federalism clear statement principle operates as
the substitute for avoidance, the Court can simply explain that the federal
statute regulates an area ordinarily regulated by states and can insist on
absolute clarity from Congress regarding its intent to displace the states’
authority. Then, finding such clarity lacking, the Court can choose an
alternative construction that does not apply the federal statute to the situation
at hand. No substantive analysis of the federalism concerns is required, and no
rewriting of the statute is necessary—just a simple presumption that tips the
scales in favor of Y rather than X interpretation.322
The chief difference between traditional and passive avoidance, then, is
that the latter enables the Court to avoid becoming mired in complex

319.
320.
321.
322.

constitutional doubts”); United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. of the U.S. v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by
one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”).
See sources cited supra note 317.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088-92 (2014) (invoking the “wellestablished principle that ‘it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of
Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides’ the ‘usual constitutional
balance of federal and state powers,’” proceeding to find no clear indication that
Congress intended to cover Bond’s local crime, and therefore construing the statute not
to apply to her crime (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991))).

578

Passive Avoidance
71 STAN. L. REV. 513 (2019)

constitutional analyses that ultimately amount to no more than advisory
opinions (since the Court is unwilling to invalidate the statute in the end). A
second difference is that passive avoidance, because it essentially ignores the
constitutional issue323—or dances around it by declaring that “ambiguity means
the criminal defendant wins” or that “lack of clarity about Congress’s intent to
intrude on state authority means the law does not apply here”—enables the
Court to avoid the appearance that it is rewriting or tweaking a clear statutory
text. Both of these differences strike me as virtues of passive avoidance.
Avoiding entanglement with difficult constitutional questions unless
absolutely necessary is one of the avoidance canon’s underlying goals.324
Passive avoidance seems to achieve that goal more effectively than traditional
avoidance, because it allows the Court to sidestep the constitutional difficulty
without engaging in significant constitutional analysis—and even, at times,
without mentioning the constitutional issue at all.325 That is, it allows the lack
of clarity in the statute—as opposed to a serious constitutional difficulty—to
serve as the justification for rejecting a problematic interpretation. This is an
advantage over traditional avoidance—which, as critics have noted, often leads
to the effective adjudication of the constitutional question the Court purports
to avoid.326
Relatedly, passive avoidance has the benefit of preventing the Court from
providing what are in effect advisory opinions on matters of constitutional
law, as it essentially did in Northwest Austin, Skilling, and NFIB. This is a virtue
for several reasons. First, it helps to preserve the Court’s legitimacy because the
Court does not appear to be priming the pump for innovative constitutional
interpretation at a later date. By contrast, the avoidance-based construction in
Northwest Austin, followed closely by the Court’s outright invalidation of the
VRA’s preclearance provisions four years later in Shelby County v. Holder,327
gave the impression that the Court had deliberately used the avoidance canon
to lay the groundwork for novel constitutional principles that it could then
understatedly adopt in a subsequent case.328
323. Many lenity opinions do not even mention the vagueness and due process concerns

324.

325.
326.

327.
328.

undergirding the canon. See, e.g., Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2280-82
(2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2222 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994).
See, e.g., William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 836 (2001) (suggesting that avoidance is an important tool for
preventing “constitutional confrontation[s] between the Court and Congress”).
This was the approach taken in Yates and Elonis. See supra Parts II.A.1, .4.
See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 283, at 89 (“[T]here is only negligible difference between the
effect of the tentative decision in an [avoidance] case and the effect of a final decision in
a case that actually decides the constitutional question.”).
See 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619-20, 2627-31 (2013).
See, e.g., Re, supra note 15, at 175.
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Second, passive avoidance is more consistent with the rule of law. It is
generally better for the Court to resolve constitutional issues in cases that
squarely present them than to use a case that is itself decided on a different
ground to foreshadow how the Court is likely to resolve the constitutional
issue down the line.329 The latter approach sows confusion and risks a
premature decisionmaking process, especially since the Court knows that its
constitutional analysis will not have any practical effect in the case before it.
Third, passive avoidance may diminish the risk that lower courts will take
the Court’s constitutional opining too seriously, or as tantamount to a
constitutional ruling. Because classic avoidance puts the constitutional issue
front and center, there is a real danger that lower courts will treat what are
essentially dicta as final determinations of constitutional issues and build off
those dicta in their own reasoning in subsequent cases. Passive avoidance, by
contrast, avoids this kind of extensive constitutional dicta and reduces the
danger that lower courts will treat the Court’s premature analysis as the
equivalent of a final adjudication. This is because even where the Court
employs lenity or the federalism clear statement principle to passively avoid
the constitutional issue, the signal it sends is not that the statute crossed a
constitutional line, but rather that the statute was not clear enough about its
intended scope to justify confronting the constitutional issue.
For similar reasons, passive avoidance is less likely than traditional
avoidance to chill legislative action. As Frederick Schauer has explained,
traditional avoidance sends a powerful signal from the Court that Congress
cannot ignore; Congress thus will refrain from amending the statute in a
manner that reaffirms the interpretation that the Court “avoided.” As Schauer
put it, “it would be quite silly for Congress to engage in this effort only to face a
highly likely invalidation” once it “know[s] that . . . the Supreme Court think[s]
such a statute probably unconstitutional.”330 In other words, once the Court
has construed a statute to avoid X interpretation on the ground that
X interpretation presents serious constitutional difficulties, it is highly
improbable that Congress will turn around and amend the statute to insist that
it in fact means X—even if X is actually the meaning that Congress originally
intended. By contrast, when the Court employs the rule of lenity or the
federalism clear statement principle to avoid the constitutional question, it is
not impossible to imagine Congress subsequently amending the relevant

329. Cf. Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2122-23 (criticizing traditional avoidance for

freeing courts from the “useful discipline of facing the real ramifications” of their
constitutional opinions); Re, supra note 15, at 182 (criticizing the Roberts Court’s
approach to avoidance for “signal[ing] major decisions while postponing the decisions’
consequences”).
330. Schauer, supra note 283, at 88-89.
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statute to make clear that it does indeed, say, criminalize the destruction of
fish331 or cover local crimes such as spreading household chemicals on the
mailbox of one’s romantic rival.332 After all, the Court has not declared the
statutes’ extension to fish or local crimes unconstitutional; it has merely ruled
that the statute as currently worded does not clearly extend to fish or local crimes
and that it is better, out of concern for vagueness and respect for federalism, to
err on the side of noninclusion. In so doing, the Court has, in effect, declared
that if Congress wishes to criminalize particular behavior or to supersede state
authority in a particular field, then it must make this intent absolutely clear in
the statute’s text. This kind of ruling invites, rather than discourages, Congress
to correct the Court’s mistake, if indeed the Court misjudged the statute’s
intended scope.
In addition, passive avoidance may be less likely to contravene Congress’s
intent than is traditional avoidance. This is particularly so when the Court uses
the mischief rule as a means of passive avoidance; because the mischief rule is
tethered to Congress’s purpose and design, it is unlikely to lead to a statutory
construction that leaves out (or covers) an application that Congress clearly
contemplated and intended for the statute to reach (or exclude). For instance, it
seems improbable that Congress intended for the evidence-tampering statute
in Yates (inspired by corporate fraud and enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act) to cover the destruction of fish; indeed, an amicus brief submitted by
Senator Oxley himself strongly indicated otherwise.333 Similarly, it seems
doubtful that Congress intended for the treaty-implementing statute in Bond to
reach a spurned wife’s use of household chemicals to injure her husband’s
paramour.334
331. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); supra Part II.A.1.
332. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); supra Part II.A.3.
333. See Brief for the Honorable Michael Oxley as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at

21-24, Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (No. 13-7451), 2014 WL 3101371. Oxley’s brief explained
that “obstruction of justice provisions are a patchwork of different rules,” reflecting a
deliberate congressional choice not to “impose a one-size-fits-all standard that applies
to all conduct” but instead to enact separate statutes keyed to specific kinds of fraud.
Id. at 23; see also id. at 21 (“[T]he government’s reading of [the statute] tends to convert
what was intended as a scalpel into a hatchet.”); id. at 23 (“The legislative record shows
that [the statute] was meant to serve a particular purpose, in the particular context of
corporate financial fraud.”).
334. It is possible that Congress intended for the statute at issue in Adoptive Couple to bar the
termination of parental rights for Indian parents who never had custody of their
children, but it is also possible that Congress simply never contemplated the statute’s
application to such a situation. See supra Part II.A.2.
Similarly, in King, it seems likely that Congress simply failed to anticipate the
widespread use of federal rather than state exchanges to purchase health insurance, and
that it therefore could not have intended to deny those enrolled on federal exchanges
the tax subsidies that made the ACA work. See, e.g., King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415,
footnote continued on next page
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But this is not necessarily the case for the early-Term avoidance cases
discussed in Part I above. Indeed, it is doubtful that Congress intended for the
honest services statute at issue in Skilling to prohibit only bribery and kickback
schemes,335 and highly improbable that Congress intended for the political
subdivision at issue in Northwest Austin to be exempt from the VRA’s
preclearance requirements.336
There are also notable potential drawbacks to the Court’s use of passive,
rather than traditional, avoidance. But the drawbacks are, in my view,
containable and outweighed by the benefits. For instance, passive avoidance
could be criticized for obscuring the Court’s true reasons for choosing
Y interpretation over X interpretation of a statute, and for silently leaving in
place a statute that several Justices believe contains serious constitutional
430-31 (E.D. Va.) (“The relevant legislative history indicates that Congress did not
expect the states to turn down federal funds and fail to create and run their own
Exchanges. Instead, Congress assumed that tax credits would be available nationwide
because every state would set up its own Exchange.”), aff’d sub nom. King v. Burwell,
759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see also David F. Hamilton,
Federal Courts and Partisan Conflict, 50 IND. L. REV. 127, 135 (2016) (calling Congress’s
failure to list federal exchanges in the statutory phrase at issue an “obvious mistake[] in
drafting”).
Congress’s intent regarding the intentionality of the threat prosecuted in Elonis is
difficult to discern. There is historical and common law support for presuming an
intent requirement in all criminal statutes. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994) (noting that courts generally “interpret[] criminal statutes to
include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms
does not contain them”); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922) (“[T]he general
rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and
proof of every crime . . . .”); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1, at
332-33 (2d ed. 2003). But it is also the case that legislators regularly want to appear
tough on crime, see, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 957 (2013), and may prefer that criminal statutes have a
broad scope.
335. See, e.g., Cristina D. Lockwood, Creating Ambiguity in the Void for Vagueness Doctrine by
Avoiding a Vagueness Determination in Review of Federal Laws, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395,
430 (2015) (“[T]he Court in Skilling created a novel interpretation of the statute not
previously adopted by any lower court and not reflective of Congress’s intent to
regulate activities other than bribes and kickbacks.”); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading,
Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1145-46 (2011)
(explaining that Congress intended for the statute at issue to restore the “pre-McNally”
honest services fraud doctrine and that the Court in Skilling gave the statute an unduly
narrow construction); Harvey A. Silverglate & Monica R. Shah, The Degradation of the
“Void For Vagueness” Doctrine: Reversing Convictions While Saving the Unfathomable
“Honest Services Fraud” Statute, 2009-2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 201, 218-19 (“There is no
support, either in case law, legislative history, or the text of the statute itself, for the
[Skilling] majority’s suggestion that Congress intended to limit the statute to bribes and
kickbacks.”).
336. See sources cited supra note 48.
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infirmities. In criminal statutes, for example, the Court’s mischief-based, veiled
avoidance approach could lead to the preservation of vague statutes, with only
a narrow carveout for the particular application that happened to come before
the Court. This could render unclear the status of different applications of the
statute that may also be void for vagueness—for example, applications that
represent prosecutorial overreaches exploiting the statute’s breadth.337 Most
such future applications will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. But
because the Court has not expressly said that the statute comes close to the
constitutional line for impermissible vagueness, lower courts may not view the
constitutional issue as seriously as they should in future cases. In other words,
by employing passive avoidance, the Court could leave lower courts with
inadequate guidance regarding how to proceed in the next case. This could
result in inconsistent rulings across future cases, as different lower court judges
make case-specific determinations about whether particular applications fall
within the statute—with or without taking vagueness considerations into
account, as they see fit. In the worst-case scenario, passive avoidance could lead
to numerous rulings upholding convictions obtained through prosecutorial
overreach if lower court judges err on the side of deferring to prosecutorial
discretion in individual cases.
This potential drawback can be mitigated, however, if lower courts pay
attention to the limits that the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretations in
passive avoidance cases do impose. The opinions in both Yates and Bond, for
example, make clear that the respective statutes’ reaches are limited to conduct
that falls within the core mischief each statute was designed to address.338 Such
mischief-based limitations could serve as guidance to lower courts about the
outer reaches of the statutes’ prohibitions—at least as a matter of statutory
interpretation, even if not as a matter of constitutional law.
Criticisms of the avoidance canon, both old and new, have tended to focus
on two perceived problems: (1) the canon empowers judges to rewrite statutes
in a manner that is inconsistent with their plain text; and (2) the canon
provides judges with the opportunity to create, or lay the groundwork for,

337. Cf., e.g., supra note 102 and accompanying text (recounting such a concern that

bothered several Justices in Yates).
338. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079 (plurality opinion) (“Mindful that in Sarbanes-Oxley,
Congress trained its attention on corporate and accounting deception and cover-ups,
we conclude that a matching construction of [the statute] is in order: A tangible object
captured by [the statute], we hold, must be one used to record or preserve information.”); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (2014) (“The substances that Bond
used bear little resemblance to the deadly toxins that are ‘of particular danger to the
objectives of the [Chemical Weapons] Convention.’” (quoting Kenyon, supra note 306,
at 17)).
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new constitutional doctrines.339 Passive avoidance sidesteps the second
problem entirely, for in giving judges a way to avoid constitutional difficulties
without discussing or acknowledging those difficulties, it minimizes
unnecessary (and potentially precedential) judicial opining about unresolved
constitutional gray areas. Passive avoidance does not necessarily eliminate the
first concern, however. Indeed, it could even empower judges to rewrite
statutes with less transparency than that demanded by the traditional form of
avoidance—a development that would exacerbate the countermajoritarian
difficulty.
This danger, however, seems more theoretical than real. Indeed, the
Roberts Court’s recent passive avoidance jurisprudence suggests reason to hope
that the rewriting problem may actually be mitigated, rather than amplified,
through passive avoidance. Specifically, by relying on the rule of lenity and the
mischief rule rather than avoidance to justify statutory readings that
effectively avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court may be subjecting
itself to a natural check on the judicial interpretation of statutes. The rule of
lenity, after all, applies only where the statute is ambiguous; even if that
ambiguity is arrived at only after considering all available interpretive tools, it
provides at least some check against blatant disregard of a plain statutory text.
Similarly, the mischief rule enables the Court to adopt a particular statutory
construction only if that construction falls within the core mischief that
Congress sought to address when it enacted the statute; in so doing, the rule
makes congressional intent a guiding principle that should serve to ameliorate
the countermajoritarian difficulty.
Passive avoidance may also be criticized on the ground that it fails to flag
the constitutional problem raised in the case, and thereby fails to educate
Congress about the constitutional lines it should steer clear of in future
legislation. This criticism has some merit and weighs heaviest in cases in which
the Court relies exclusively on the mischief rule to effectuate its passive
avoidance. This is because the mischief rule, by itself, provides no information
about constitutional boundaries or issues. For example, if the Court has serious
339. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in

BENCHMARKS 196, 211-12 (1967) (explaining that the avoidance canon risks judicial
rewriting of statutes); Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2111-12 (criticizing the
avoidance canon for empowering courts both to rewrite statutes and to articulate new
constitutional principles); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (observing that the avoidance
canon “create[s] a judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’ that has much the same
prohibitory effect as the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself”);
Re, supra note 15 (arguing that the Roberts Court has used avoidance canon to lay the
groundwork for “disruptive” constitutional rulings); Schauer, supra note 283 (criticizing the avoidance canon for enabling courts to interpret statutes in a manner the
drafters did not intend and would not prefer).
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equal protection concerns about X interpretation, but in construing the statute
relies solely on the evil the statute was designed to remedy, Congress will
never be put on notice about the Court’s equal protection concerns. In cases
where the Court uses lenity or the federalism clear statement principle as a tool
of passive avoidance, however, this criticism carries less weight. The rule of
lenity, notably, is animated by due process concerns of fair notice; the
federalism clear statement principle is similarly animated by Tenth
Amendment concerns. Thus, the Court’s very reliance on these canons signals
to Congress that the statute (or application) at issue raises due process or
federalism concerns. While such loose signaling may not provide the level of
clarity about constitutional limits that a more traditional avoidance analysis
might provide, it similarly identifies the constitutional issue and puts Congress
on notice that it should be more specific about the criminal statute’s scope or its
intent to intrude on state regulatory authority.
Critics might also argue that passive avoidance eliminates a useful tool that
empowers the Court to protect “underenforced constitutional norms” without
expending political capital or making difficult line-drawing decisions.340 This
is a fair point. In my view, however, the judicial protection of underenforced
constitutional norms through statutory interpretation is itself a departure
from the underlying goal of the avoidance canon—to minimize judicial
interference with the work of Congress. That is, judicial use of the avoidance
canon to protect underenforced constitutional norms is itself a form of judicial
activism rather than restraint. For in construing a statute to mean Y rather
than X because X interpretation—although more natural or straightforward—
treads on some underenforced constitutional value, the Court deliberately
rejects Congress’s intended meaning in favor of a plausible but second-best
meaning that it can use to deliver a constitutional lecture. So while passive
avoidance may remove a useful quiver from the judiciary’s bow, in so doing, it
may also better serve the underlying principles of constitutional avoidance
than does its traditional counterpart.
Finally, passive avoidance might be criticized on the ground that, like
traditional avoidance, it distorts Congress’s intent by giving the statute a
different meaning or scope than legislators envisioned when they drafted it.
A truly restrained Court, one might argue, would do better to adopt the
meaning Congress intended and confront the constitutional question headon—leaving it to Congress to concoct a constitutionally sound revision that is

340. See, e.g., Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 2159-60 (arguing that the avoidance canon is

a “valuable method” for enabling judicial enforcement of constitutional norms that are
difficult to enforce, while still “leav[ing] the hard line-drawing and enforcement
problems” to Congress, “the branch best suited to resolve them”).
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“close to its most-preferred position.”341 In other words, it sometimes might be
better for the Court to invalidate a statute as unconstitutional than to contort
it into a different statute. I am sympathetic to this concern and agree that in
some cases—particularly those in which Congress’s intent to cover the
problematic application is clear—striking down the statute may be the better
approach. My point is simply that when the Court concludes otherwise—
irrespective of whether observers agree with the decision to avoid the
constitutional question and uphold the statute—passive avoidance may be a
better means to that end than traditional avoidance.
Conclusion
This Article has highlighted a shift, or at least a noteworthy inconsistency,
in the Roberts Court’s avoidance canon jurisprudence over the past twelve
years. It has argued that whereas the early Roberts Court boldly invoked the
canon to openly rewrite statutes whose plain meaning it found constitutionally problematic, in recent years the Court has tamped down its use of the
avoidance canon—often refusing to mention the canon or the constitutional
issue, and instead finding other interpretive tools through which to rewrite or
reinterpret a statute whose most straightforward reading presents
constitutional difficulties. This Article has offered a possible explanation for
the evolution of the Court’s use of avoidance, suggesting that the Court may be
engaging in a deliberate retreat in response to criticism of its once-aggressive
use of the canon. Throughout, this Article’s aim has been to highlight the
Court’s unnoticed, passive use of avoidance in recent cases and to inspire
deeper theoretical reflection about what motivates the Court’s decision to
rely—or to avoid relying—on this powerful interpretive canon. In the end, this
Article suggests that passive avoidance may be a desirable judicial practice—and
the truest form of constitutional avoidance.

341. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO

IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 105 (1997).
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Appendix
The Roberts Court’s Use of the Avoidance Canon over Time, 2006-2017
Each avoidance canon opinion listed in Tables A.1 and A.2 below was
evaluated to determine the level of constitutional discussion the Court engaged
in when invoking the canon. An opinion was marked as containing “little
discussion” if it merely mentioned a potential constitutional infirmity without
providing analysis of how or why a particular interpretation might violate the
Constitution. An opinion was marked as containing “some discussion” if it
made more than minimal mention of the constitutional issue. Typically, these
opinions explained the potential basis for the constitutional infirmity but did
not evaluate the probability that the interpretation at issue would violate the
Constitution. These discussions also were typically short in length (no more
than one or two sentences). An opinion was coded as containing “significant
discussion” if it evaluated the potential constitutional infirmity in depth
and/or contained a detailed explanation of why the interpretation at issue
probably would run afoul of the Constitution.
Each opinion was also evaluated for the level of reliance it placed on the
canon. An opinion was coded as containing “passing reliance” if it made
minimal reference to the canon, or mentioned it only as a fallback or add-on
argument supporting a construction already reached through other
interpretive tools. An opinion was coded as involving “some reliance” on the
avoidance canon if it made more than minimal reference to the canon, but did
not rely on the canon as the main justification for the construction it adopted.
An opinion was coded as containing “primary reliance” if it relied primarily or
heavily on the avoidance canon to justify the result reached.
Finally, each opinion was coded as “liberal,” “conservative,” or “unspecified.” Because ideology is difficult to gauge and involves judgment calls, and in
order to facilitate replicability, I imported the ideology coding used for the
Spaeth Supreme Court Database342 rather than devise my own parameters for
evaluating the ideological valence of the opinion.

342. For information on this database, see The Genesis of the Database, WASH. U. L.: SUP. CT.

DATABASE, https://perma.cc/GMN5-EC5A (archived Feb. 23, 2019). For access to
datasets, see Modern Database: 2018 Release 02, WASH. U. L.: SUP. CT. DATABASE,
https://perma.cc/S5LU-PMUZ (archived Feb. 23, 2019).
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